PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCE: WHEN PUBLIC OPINION DETERMINES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
NATHANIEL PERSILY
††
KELLI LAMMIE

†

This study tests the empirical assumptions about American public opinion
found in the Supreme Court’s opinions concerning campaign finance reform. The
area of campaign finance is a unique one in First Amendment law because the
Court has allowed the mere appearance of a problem (in this case, “corruption”) to
justify the curtailment of recognized First Amendment rights of speech and association. Since Buckley v. Valeo, defendants in campaign finance cases have proffered various types of evidence to support the notion that the public perceives a
great deal of corruption produced by the campaign finance system. Most recently,
in McConnell v. FEC, in which the Court upheld the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law, both the Department of Justice and the plaintiffs conducted
and submitted into evidence public opinion polls measuring the public’s perception
of corruption. This article examines the data presented in that case, but also examines forty years of survey data of public attitudes toward corruption in government. We argue that trends in public perception of corruption may have little to
do with the campaign finance system. The share of the population describing government as corrupt went down even as soft money contributions skyrocketed.
Moreover, the survey data suggest that an individual’s perception of corruption
derives to some extent from that person’s (1) position in society (race, income, education level); (2) opinion of the incumbent President and performance of the economy over the previous year; (3) attitudes concerning taxation and “big government”; and (4) propensity to trust other people, in general. Although we conclude
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that, indeed, a large majority of Americans believe that the campaign finance system contributes to corruption in government, the data do not suggest that campaign finance reform will have an effect on these attitudes.

When government lawyers make arguments seeking to justify a
state’s infringement of a constitutional right, they tend not to say
something like “most people think a problem exists, so the state has a
compelling interest in allaying their fears.” Yet in the context of campaign finance, government lawyers not only make such an argument,
but such reasoning and evidence have become almost mandatory as
1
courts have struggled to follow the line of cases from Buckley v. Valeo
2
to McConnell v. FEC. Among the unique exceptions to general First
Amendment law made in the context of campaign finance regulation,
those cases have established that the mere appearance of a problem
(in this case, “corruption”) is sufficient to justify infringements on
recognized First Amendment rights (in this case, the rights of association and expression). Most recently, to support this argument, lawyers have offered and judges have accepted public opinion polls demonstrating that Americans perceive a great deal of corruption arising
from large contributions to candidates and political parties or from
certain types of expenditures on behalf of those parties and candidates. To date, very little has been written on public perception of
corruption in general, or on the data that link such perceptions to
3
problems in the campaign finance system. This Article attempts to do
both.
We begin in Part I by briefly sketching the evolution of the appearance-of-corruption rationale for campaign finance regulation.
1

424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
3
The one exception is the work of David Primo. See generally Jeffrey Milyo, David
Primo & Timothy Groseclose, Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective, 2 BUS.
& POL. 75 (2000) (discussing the disproportionate amount of attention paid to corporate PAC campaign contributions relative to their importance in policy-making process); David M. Primo, Campaign Contributions, the Appearance of Corruption, and Trust in
Government, in INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE BATTLE: COURT TESTIMONY ON THE NEW
REFORMS 285 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 2003) (rebutting claims that there are links
among campaign finance law, the appearance of corruption, and trust in government);
David M. Primo, Public Opinion and Campaign Finance, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
OPINION (forthcoming 2004) (illustrating that campaign finance reform is not a policy
priority for most Americans, that the public generally favors reform, and that most
Americans believe that reforms will not change politics significantly); David M. Primo,
Public Opinion and Campaign Finance: Reformers Versus Reality, 7 INDEP. REV. 207 (2002)
(reviewing public opinion data which illustrates that while the public generally favors
campaign finance reform, it does not consider it a priority, and that trust in government is not linked to campaign spending).
2
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We argue that the Court’s invocation of this novel state interest has
less to do with the importance of removing unsavory appearances and
more to do with the difficulty of proving actual corruption. Reliance
on combating the appearance or perception of impropriety serves as a
fallback state interest in the likely event that one cannot make the difficult showing that campaign contributions have actually influenced a
representative’s vote or official conduct.
In Part II we present data used in McConnell v. FEC to make the
strongest argument in favor of the notion that the public perceives a
great deal of corruption arising from campaign contributions. Although we are critical of the way public opinion polls have been deployed in that case, among others, we admit the obvious: the American public believes that contributors exert undue influence over the
decisions of members of Congress. We should even concede up front
that we too believe that representatives have been influenced by campaign contributions: money buys access and in some cases, may buy
votes.
In Part III, we present data not previously employed in campaign
finance litigation. We suggest that the share of the population viewing
government as corrupt rises and falls with the popularity of the incumbent President: declining during successful wars and periods of
economic growth and surging during periods of recession and malaise. We also splice the public opinion data according to several different demographic and political variables to get a sense of which subsections of the American population are more likely to perceive
corruption and why. Our analysis reveals that, to a limited extent,
those with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to perceive corruption. More significantly, general antigovernment feelings, specific
anti-incumbent attitudes, and opinion as to the performance of the
economy also seem to correlate strongly with feelings about corruption in government. Finally, for some individuals, belief that government is corrupt is a natural outgrowth of their psychological predisposition to mistrust people in general. Cynics believe people are selfish
and corrupt, so it should come as no surprise that they consider government corrupt as well.
In Part IV we present our conclusions. As we note there, this Article has a little something for everyone in the campaign finance debate. For defenders of recent reforms, we validate their gut reaction
that the public sees large campaign contributions as unduly influencing the official behavior of members of Congress. Indeed, such
perceptions of corruption extend not only to givers of the large con-
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tributions banned by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)
4
and earlier reforms but also to contributions made within the law’s
limits. It seems a fair inference to us that Americans perceive campaign contributions of almost any size as leading to undue influence
of the contributor over the recipient. Opponents of the reforms
might find solace in the latter finding and in the finding that trends in
general attitudes of corruption seem unrelated to anything happening
in the campaign finance system (e.g., a rise in contributions or the introduction of a particular reform). For those less interested in campaign finance, we analyze survey data concerning public perceptions
of government corruption more generally. We try to explain which
subsets of the population perceive the government as crooked or unduly influenced, as well as how and why such perceptions have
changed over time. In the end, we discourage the use of any such
data in litigation: if courts continue to hold that campaign finance is
one of those areas of the law where, in effect, “appearances do mat5
ter,” we hope judges will not base their decisions on a headcount of
the American people.
We present in this article an ambitious argument with limited
goals. It is ambitious given the scope and time frame of the data we
analyze and the case law we canvass. However, our goals are limited in
that we are working within the current framework of campaign finance law to suggest that one type of evidence, namely public opinion
polls, should not be used to support arguments as to the state’s interest in combating the appearance of corruption. We should admit two
drawbacks to our approach. First, by operating within the current
framework, we fall into the same trap that has snared the current
Court and those who have analyzed the campaign finance decisions:
namely, the alternating tendencies of the word “corruption” to mean
everything and nothing. For purposes of this article we accept the
prevailing notion in the case law that corruption, in this context, re6
fers to “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment” as manifested in “the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the

4

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36, 47 U.S.C.); see also Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 591-610 (2000)).
5
Cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (ruling that bizarrely shaped congressional districts may trigger strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment).
6
FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001).
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7

wishes of large contributors.” While buying into this definition of
corruption, we do not mean either to advocate for it or to suggest that
corruption should continue to eclipse other potential state interests
that could justify campaign finance regulation. Simply put, we recognize that the concept of corruption can mean more and less than the
Supreme Court has said it does, and we recognize that other state interests, such as leveling the electoral playing field or allowing officeholders to concentrate on their jobs instead of fundraising, may provide better justifications for campaign finance reform.
Second, we also acknowledge the limits of the data and the methodology we use to test our various hypotheses. Although we believe
that public perception of corruption has almost nothing to do with activity actually taking place in the campaign finance system, and we are
convinced that campaign finance reform will have no effect on public
perception of corruption, we cannot prove either argument. We admit
that the available long-term survey data, which measures perceptions
of “crookedness” and whether “government is run by a few big interests,” do not precisely answer the more relevant constitutional questions concerning the perception of corruption arising from large
campaign contributions. Moreover, insofar as the long-term survey
data or the sporadic campaign finance-specific polls we analyze suggest an answer to those more relevant questions, we acknowledge that
the inability of the campaign finance system to affect such perceptions
might be a product of the constraints placed by the jurisprudence itself or by what has heretofore remained politically possible. In other
words, we cannot dispel the good-government notion that campaign
finance reform would have an effect on such attitudes if only the state
were able to begin clamping down on campaign expenditures (a path
the case law now closes off) or if the state were able to enact a generous public funding system that might make other contributions less
relevant (a path closed off by political realities).
Finally, at several times we note the irony that the share of the
population perceiving corruption declined even as soft money skyrocketed and that the share increased after passage of the soft money
ban. Although we find that perverse outcome to be quite important,
we cannot eliminate the possibilities that fewer people would have
viewed government as corrupt had soft money always been banned, or
that even more people today might view government as corrupt had

7

Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976) (per curiam)).
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Congress not banned soft money. In the end, we hope that this empirical claim, like the others in this article, serves to undercut what we
consider to be the prevailing wisdom in the jurisprudence, even if we
cannot disprove all alternative theories that might link campaign finance activity with individual or aggregate perceptions of corruption.
I. THE UNIQUE PLACE OF PUBLIC OPINION
IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
It is worth noting at the outset the extraordinary nature of the
state’s interest in preventing appearances of corruption in the context
8
of First Amendment law. In general, when core First Amendment
rights of political speech and association are at stake, courts apply
strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling state interest and means that
9
are narrowly tailored to address that interest. Catering to irrational
fears never constitutes a compelling state interest. In fact, in Equal
Protection jurisprudence, irrational fear is often listed as one of the
few bases insufficient to justify laws to which courts apply the lowest
10
level of scrutiny, aptly termed rational basis review.
In general, the state has a compelling interest only in addressing
problems that are both real and significant.
“[W]hen the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means
to . . . prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply posit the
existence of the disease sought to be cured. . . . It must demonstrate that
the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regula11
tion will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”

8

For a more developed exploration of the source of this argument, see D. Bruce
La Pierre, Campaign Contribution Limits: Pandering to Public Fears About “Big Money” and
Protecting Incumbents, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 687, 713-14 (2000).
9
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“When a law
burdens core political speech, we apply ‘exacting scrutiny’ and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”).
10
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (finding a state constitutional
amendment to be motivated by “animus toward the class it affects [and thus] . . .
lack[ing] a rational relationship to legitimate state interests”); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 474 (1985) (striking down a local ordinance that
was based on the “vague, undifferentiated fears of ignorant or frightened residents”
(internal quotations and citation omitted)).
11
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995)
(quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (internal quotations omitted)). The Court specifically rejected the application of this standard for the campaign finance context in Nixon, 528 U.S. at 377.
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Government cannot squelch speech, let alone political speech,
based upon a guess as to the speech’s bad consequences. This is not
to say that the obvious needs to be proven: people need not be trampled before the government outlaws the shouting of “Fire!” in a
crowded (non-burning) theater. However, when the scale and nature
of the harm is not obvious, evidence as to its existence is usually a necessary predicate to such speech being regulated under constitutional
law.
As the case law discussed in this Part illustrates, campaign finance
is one area in constitutional law where reality and appearances stand
on an equal footing. The prevention of actual or apparent corruption
exists as a compelling state interest, indeed the only state interest,
which can justify regulation of campaign contributions or, with respect
to corporate and union treasury money, even independent campaign
12
expenditures. In the first two subparts, we provide the Court’s rationale for this exception to the general rule of reality in First
Amendment law. In the third subpart we attempt to provide what we
think are more powerful reasons for making appearances matter in
campaign finance.
A. Buckley v. Valeo’s Emphasis on Appearances
13

In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court held that a compelling interest in preventing actual and apparent corruption underlay Congress’s passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
14
1974. The Court found these interests to be significant enough to
justify curtailing the rights of expression and association implicated in
restrictions on the amount of money a contributor could give to a
15
Unlike restrictions on individual expenditures, which
candidate.
implicate core political speech and therefore trigger strict scrutiny,
12

See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 449-545 (reviewing the
Supreme Court caselaw on campaign finance); DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD
L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 705-817 (2d. ed. 2001) (same).
13
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
14
Id. at 26.
15
Buckley accorded a lower level of scrutiny to campaign contributions than to
campaign expenditures. The former were seen as less protected because they implicated association more than speech. To the degree contributions were speech, they
were largely speech by proxy and the expression entailed in the mere giving of a contribution was not magnified by the amount of the contribution. Limits on individuals’
expenditures, on the other hand, restrict core political speech and therefore cannot be
limited. Id. at 51-59.
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contribution restrictions are subject to less-than-strict scrutiny (sometimes called “Buckley scrutiny”). For the purposes of this Article, however, the significant aspect of the scrutiny the Court brings to bear on
campaign contribution restrictions is the need for the state to justify
such laws based on their prevention of actual corruption or the appearance of corruption.
Although a precise definition of corruption may be elusive, few
would doubt the state’s interest in combating or preventing corruption. The Buckley Court analogized large campaign contributions to
bribes: “To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a
political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the in17
tegrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.”
Corruption by way of campaign contributions is tantamount to corruption by way of payoffs for the recipient’s personal gain. In each
case the donor acquires undue influence merely because of the
money that changes hands and inures to the candidate’s benefit.
True, in the case of bribery the money is for the governing official’s
personal benefit, while campaign contributions can only be used for
activities relating to the pursuit of office. Nevertheless, the problem
such regulations address is the same: to prevent the economically
powerful from using their financial position to buy political favors.
Of course, corruption means different things to different people
or, for that matter, to different Justices on the Supreme Court. Buckley
clarified that corruption extends beyond bribery to “undue influence
18
on an officeholder’s judgment” as manifested in “the broader threat
19
from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”
In other cases, the Court has described corruption more generally as
“a subversion of the political process. Elected officials are influenced
to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of finan20
cial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns.”
The McConnell Court took up this theme of legitimate and illegitimate
influences on an officeholder’s judgment: “Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that
16

Specifically, such scrutiny translates into the following: burdens on contributions “may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest
[namely, preventing corruption or its appearance] and employs means closely drawn
to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.” Id. at 25.
17
Id. at 26-27.
18
FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001).
19
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000) (quoting Buckley, 424
U.S. at 28).
20
FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985).
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officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of
their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have
21
made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.” Finally, the definition of corruption varies across campaign finance contexts. In the special case of corporate expenditures, corruption has
expanded to include “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s sup22
port for the corporation’s political ideas.”
We have little to add to the many comprehensive discussions and
critiques of these varied and often contradictory notions of corruption.23 Previewing the empirical study we present later, we should
simply point out, as others do, that the notions of “undue influence”
or “corrosive and distorting effects” assume a baseline as to what constitutes “due” influence or the proper effect one’s actions or contributions should have on a legislator’s judgment. Such a baseline is inherently elusive, and as we describe later, people tend to view their
opponents or disfavored candidates as overly influential or unduly influenced, and their friends or favored candidates as having purer motives for their political actions. Moreover, as should be obvious, corruption in common and legal parlance extends to actions beyond
those captured by the concepts of undue influence or bribery. It includes conflicts of interest, graft, extortion, nepotism, cronyism, or patronage, and for the person on the street it may encompass incompetent governance, lying, excessive partisanship, or abuse of power.
In any event, courts have considered the state’s interest in preventing the appearance of corruption as arising from the desire to create a
system in which quid pro quos do not appear to be taking place or big
24
In the Buckley
donors do not appear to have undue influence.
21

McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 666 (2003).
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
23
See generally Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law,
14 CONST. COMMENT. 127 (1997) (discussing both the possibilities and the limits of
understanding campaign finance as an issue of corruption); Bruce E. Cain, Moralism
and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 111 (critiquing the moralist/idealist approach and linking the “real” interests of campaign finance reform to
the principles of a procedural democracy); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The
Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1719-26 (1999) (outlining
the effects of, and proposed solutions to, the problem of perceived corruption in campaign finance).
24
See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389 (summarizing the state’s interest in combating corruption as extending to “improper influence” and “the broader threat from politicians too
compliant with the wishes of large contributors”).
22
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Court’s words: “Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid
pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inher25
ent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.” Thus,
the state has an interest in avoiding these ugly appearances because
“public awareness” of the mere opportunity for influence could erode
public trust in representatives and representative institutions. “Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative [g]overnment is not to be eroded to a disastrous
26
extent.’”
The state has an interest in combating the appearance of corruption, then, not because such appearances are inherently bad, but because such appearances result in second-order effects: public cynicism, alienation, lack of trust, and lack of confidence in government.
If government seems to be for sale to the highest bidder, the argument goes, the American people become disenchanted with politics,
lose faith in their democracy, and believe that their votes do not make
a difference. Under this view, the government loses legitimacy when
the public perceives campaign contributions as having a greater effect
than do constituent preferences or a representative’s conscience on a
representative’s behavior.
B. Proving the Appearance of Corruption from Buckley to McConnell
From the time Buckley laid down this unique state interest
27
grounded on combating appearances, courts have found various
ways of demonstrating that such appearances exist. On its face, the
appearance of corruption standard does not necessarily require sophisticated empirical studies of any sort, let alone public opinion
polls. Either contributions or expenditures at a given amount appear
to corrupt (that is, appear to give the contributor or spender too
much influence) or they do not. One might be able to answer the
question in the abstract even without a factual showing in the traditional sense: does a person who gives X dollars to a candidate or
party, for example, appear to gain undue influence as a result of the
contribution? Nevertheless, courts have relied on the following cate25

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. (quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
27
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
26
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gories of evidence to demonstrate that such appearances exist: newspaper accounts, testimony from politicians, experts and other witnesses, referendum results, and public opinion polls.
Such evidence can support an inference of an appearance of corruption in several ways. If such evidence demonstrates actual corruption, then it ineluctably demonstrates an appearance of corruption.
In other words, if the fact finder can discern from the evidence presented that an actual quid pro quo took place, then by definition the
contribution appears (at least to the fact-finder, if no one else) to corrupt as well. Second, these different forms of evidence may offer
opinions as to what an individual perceives. The government will offer evidence that amounts to a declaration that “the system appears
corrupt to me”—where the “me” could be an expert, politician, poll
respondent, or editorial board, who feel that certain practices amount
to corruption. Finally, such evidence could consist of opinions as to
what others think. For example, a pollster or other expert might attest to the public’s view that certain practices appear corrupt, or a
newspaper editorial could suggest that the public believes a certain
politician is corrupt. Such evidence amounts to a witness’s declaration
that, whatever the truth of the matter or whatever her personal opinion, it appears to some people that something fishy is going on.
Newspaper stories and editorials provide a rich source of evidence
28
of appearance of corruption. Defendants will submit news clippings
that report on campaign finance incidents and seeming abuses, as well
as opinion pieces that attest to the appearance of corruption in the
current system. The evidence submitted and accepted by the court in
29
Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, which
30
upheld a Maine law limiting contributions, is both typical and typically vacuous:
28

See, e.g., Nixon, 528 U.S. at 391-392 (finding that newspaper accounts of large
contributions supported inferences of impropriety); Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 457 (1st Cir. 2000) (surveying some
of the “abundant file of press clippings” which included “both news stories and editorial comment”); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 618 (Alaska 1999)
(citing newspaper articles supporting the assertion that lobbyists’ contributions are
“especially susceptible to creating an appearance of corruption”); State v. Dodd, 561
So. 2d 263, 266-67 (Fla. 1990) (disagreeing with cited newspaper editorials labeling
the trial court’s order a “victory for corruption”).
29
205 F.3d at 445.
30
Id. at 471-72 (upholding ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1015(1) (West 1999)
(limiting contributions from individuals to candidates for state legislature) and tit. 21A, §§ 1015(2), 1056(1) (West 1999) (limiting contributions from groups and associates
to candidates for state legislature)).
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One story states that “[r]anking lawmakers and their committees
pulled in close to $400,000 in big gifts from special interests, almost all of
which lobby the Legislature.” Paul Carrier, Contributions Give Special Interests Political ‘Box Seats,’ Maine Sunday Telegram, Jan. 3, 1999, at 1A. One
column declared, “There is nothing illegal about tobacco companies
bankrolling political campaigns—only suspicious. We can debate the influence of campaign contributions till the cows come home, but one fact
remains: The money is given on the expectation that it will influence
policy.” Editorial, Taking the Money, Maine Times, May 15, 1997. This
sentiment has been oft-repeated: “A group with a certain point of view
can buy influence during a political campaign with a campaign donation. Politicians routinely deny that influence is being bought; evidence
is often to the contrary.” Editorial, A Stain-Guard for State Government,
Lewiston Sun-J., May 7, 1997. . . .
The fundraising practices of Maine legislators have drawn much criticism. One article reported negatively on a fundraising breakfast that an
organization hosted for legislators who served on a committee handling
bills affecting the organization, emphasizing the absence of average citizens. See Bill Nemitz, Dough Rises for Political Pancakes, Portland Press
Herald, Mar. 8, 1996, at 1B. Another questioned the propriety of an industry hosting a fundraiser for a legislator the day before a hearing on an
important bill affecting the industry. See Editorial, Gravel Industry Didn’t
Expect Anything for Lord Fund-Raiser?, Portland Press Herald, Mar. 26,
1996, at 6A. An editorial criticizing such fundraisers commented, “The
whiff of too-close connections between influential lawmakers and interests with big money on the line added an acrid aroma to legislating in
both the House and the Senate this session.” Nancy Grape, Let’s Change
the Pockets Instead of Pocketing the Change, Portland Press Herald, Apr. 7,
31
1996, at 5C.

Editorials and opinion pieces swim alongside news reports of
shady deals and influence peddling, with each journalist’s account or
editorial board’s outrage used to build a case of apparent corruption.
The editorials signify that someone is perceiving corruption: namely,
the editorial boards. The journalistic accounts serve to imply, if not
directly prove, that campaign contributors often get privileged access
and influence.
The Supreme Court gave its blessing to the use of journalistic ac32
counts in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC. There the Court
held, quite importantly for our purposes, that the amount of proof required to demonstrate corruption or its appearance will “vary up or
33
down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.” In
31
32
33

Id. at 457.
528 U.S. at 391-92.
Id. at 391.
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other words, because the notion that campaign contributors have significant, if not “undue,” influence hardly represents new thinking or
improbable logic, the evidence required to show such a relationship
may only need to pass the laugh test. Among other pieces of evidence
discussed later, the defendants in Nixon pointed to a newspaper editorial discussing the state treasurer’s receipt of a $20,000 campaign contribution from the same bank he later decided to use for the state’s
34
official business, and to an article discussing large contributions from
35
a brewery and a bank to a candidate for state auditor. Although edi36
torials and journalists’ accounts do not persuade every court, after
Nixon, if not before, defenders of campaign finance reform would do
well to pad their briefs with such easy-to-find vignettes from the newspapers.
If the newspapers are found wanting, however, defendants can
turn to the sponsors of a campaign finance bill or other politicians to
submit their own testimony as to the appearance of corruption. This
type of evidence appeared to be the most significant for the Supreme
37
Court in McConnell v. FEC, which quotes extensively from testimony
38
submitted by former and sitting Senators. In Nixon, the Court credited an affidavit of a state senator who merely said, “large contribu-

34

Id. at 393 (citing Editorial, The Central Issue Is Trust, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Dec. 31, 1993, at 6C).
35
Id. (citing Jo Mannies, Auditor Race May Get Too Noisy to Be Ignored, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 11, 1994, at 4B).
36
See, e.g., Ariz. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002,
1010 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that newspaper articles expressing dismay over the
level of negative campaigning in recent elections were insufficient as proof of the appearance of corruption necessary to justify regulation of PACs); Russell v. Burris, 146
F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that the public’s view of corruption was not “objectively reasonable” and pointing to a newspaper article in which one legislator explained that his vote on a tobacco bill was based on substance, not the contributions he
received from the tobacco industry); Democratic Party of the United States v. Nat’l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 578 F. Supp. 797, 829-30 & n.47 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(applying a “reasonable person standard in evaluating whether press reports can give
rise to a belief that corruption exists,” rejecting some stories as hearsay, and ultimately
striking down the law as not justified by the corruption interest), aff’d in part sub nom.
FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985); State v. Dodd,
561 So. 2d 263, 266-67 (Fla. 1990) (striking down a ban on contributions during the
legislative session despite journalist accounts that showed a “crisis of confidence” in
state government).
37
124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
38
See id. at 663-65 (quoting testimony of Senators Warren Rudman, John McCain,
Alan Simpson, and Paul Simon).
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39

tions have ‘the real potential to buy votes.’” Of course, such testimony is only one species of testimony by experts, contributors, and
others involved in the campaign finance system, who attest to the
power, access, and influence contributors enjoy. Indeed, an entire
book has been published of the expert reports submitted in McCon40
nell. Political scientists, party officials, campaign consultants, contributors, and politicians (both current and former) submitted affidavits attesting to the undue influence of large contributions on the
41
political process. As with newspaper stories, defendants offer such
testimony to support claims of actual corruption, or of the affiant’s or
public’s perception of corruption.
Referendum results and public opinion polls serve principally to
demonstrate that the public, rather than the witness submitting the
results of the poll, sees a corruption problem and supports the given
solution. Although the Court in Nixon was quick to point out that
“majority votes do not, as such, defeat First Amendment protections,”
it found the referendum vote on the campaign finance restriction
42
there significant. According to the Court, “the statewide vote . . . certainly attested to the perception relied upon here: ‘An overwhelming
74 percent of the voters of Missouri determined that contribution lim43
its are necessary to combat corruption and the appearance thereof.’”
Of course, support for a campaign finance reform proposal does not
necessarily mean the public perceives corruption or that the interest
behind the law is constitutionally legitimate: some might support reforms because of a feeling that they will equalize the electoral playing
field, reduce the total amount of money in politics, give government
officials more time to dedicate to official business, or reduce the
number of negative attack ads. Nevertheless, widespread public support for reform as expressed through direct democracy, especially if
the campaign surrounding the initiative focused on the corrupting

39

Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 393 (2000) (quoting the affidavit
of State Senator Wayne Goode, co-chair of the state legislature’s Interim Joint Committee on Campaign Finance Reform at the time the contribution limits in question were
enacted).
40
See generally INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE BATTLE, supra note 3 (excerpting
expert witness reports utilized in the McConell litigation).
41
Id.
42
Nixon, 528 U.S. at 394.
43
Id. (quoting Carver v. Nixon, 882 F. Supp. 901, 905 (W.D. Mo.), rev’d, 72 F.3d
633 (8th Cir. 1995)).
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potential of contributions, can serve as one indicator of public percep44
tion of corruption.
We spend much of the next Part examining public opinion polls
concerning corruption and campaign finance, so only a brief discussion is warranted here. Suffice it to say that public opinion polls have
become a regular part of the state’s offer of proof of the appearance
of corruption in campaign finance cases. In Daggett, the court noted
that 70% of survey respondents “believed that large campaign contributions were a major source of political corruption” and that new lim45
its on contributions would bolster faith in the democratic process. In
46
Montana Right to Life Ass’n v. Eddleman, the court accepted polls showing that 78% of Montana voters thought money was “synonymous with
power” and that 69% of Montanans believed “elected officials g[a]ve
47
special treatment” to large contributors. In Homans v. City of Albu48
querque, the district court, while striking down spending limits as unconstitutional under Buckley, accepted a public opinion poll of city
voters who believed that federal elections, which had no spending limits, were more susceptible to special interest influence than local elec49
tions, which were governed by spending limits. Furthermore, in the
district court decision in McConnell, Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s opinion
provided a near-catalogue of the public opinion data offered by the
defendants with respect to the overwhelming majorities who viewed
50
soft money contributors as having undue influence.
Courts have differed as to whether such polls by themselves prove
51
an appearance of corruption or save an otherwise unconstitutional
44

See Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d
445, 458 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[W]e take note, as did the Court in Shrink Missouri PAC, of
the fact that Maine voters approved the referendum imposing reduced contribution
limits as indicative of their perception of corruption.”); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties
Union, 978 P.2d 597, 602 (Alaska 1999) (noting that “over 30,000 people signed the
petition” for a proposed campaign finance ballot initiative, and crediting a former state
House member who personally gathered signatures for the initiative and who testified
that a “constant refrain” of citizens was that “the Legislature was owned by special interests”).
45
Daggett, 205 F.3d at 457.
46
343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 5563 (U.S. Oct. 4,
2004).
47
Id. at 1093.
48
217 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D.N.M. 2002), cert. denied, 366 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 2004).
49
Id. at 1201.
50
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 512-15 (D.D.C.) (opinion of KollarKotelly, J.), aff’d in part, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
51
Some courts will delve into the survey design and results to determine whether
they actually demonstrate a public perception of corruption. See, e.g., Suster v. Mar-
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52

law. However, such polls attempt to provide concrete evidence as to
whether the Supreme Court’s concerns in Buckley regarding the erosion of public confidence in government have come to fruition. The
other types of evidence entail an observation by elites (judges, journalists, politicians, experts) as to whether the campaign finance regime
appears corrupt. The public opinion polls likewise attest to how the
system appears, but they also have the potential to add information as
to how many people perceive corruption and whether second order
effects of this apparent corruption (widespread alienation, lack of
confidence, distrust, etc.) have emerged. With that said, one point of
this Article is to make the argument that such polls do not actually tap
into the second order effects that form the justification for the Supreme Court’s inclusion of “appearances” as a unique state interest
here. Moreover, we argue that an individual’s perception of corruption often has little to do with events in the campaign finance system.
C. What Is the Emphasis on Appearances Really About?
Even assuming few measurable deleterious consequences result
from negative public opinion about government, most would prefer a
political state of affairs in which citizens do not consider their government corrupt. Nor do we doubt the importance—in an abstract,
shall, 149 F.3d 523, 532 (6th Cir. 1998) (rejecting relevance of poll showing that 56%
of respondents believed spending limits in judicial elections would be helpful in limiting the influence of contributions); Republican Party of Minn. v. Pauly, 63 F. Supp. 2d
1008, 1017-18 (D. Minn. 1999) (rejecting survey concerning party expenditures and
perception of corruption as self-serving and flawed); Democratic Party of the United
States v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 578 F. Supp. 797, 825-827 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (picking apart a poll that attempted to prove that PAC spending gave rise to an
appearance of corruption), aff’d in part sub nom. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
52
In Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 911, 918 (6th Cir. 1998), the court
struck down an expenditure limit despite the existence of a poll which found that
an overwhelming majority of residents believe that large contributors wield
undue influence on the political system as a whole; that ordinary voters are
unable to participate on equal footing in the process; that wealthy candidates
unfairly drown out candidates with fewer resources; that the high costs of elections discourage qualified individuals from running for office, which deprives
voters of a full choice of candidates; and that overall, money is undermining
the fairness and integrity of the political system and causing them to lose faith
in the democratic process.
See also Mont. Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, 28 F. Supp. 2d 593, 598 (D.
Mont. 1998) (mentioning a poll showing displeasure among Montana citizens due to
the “perception of excessive corporate spending during ballot issue campaigns,” but
finding a segregated fund requirement for corporate initiative spending unconstitutional).
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philosophical, or even practical sense—of public opinion about
whether government is being properly influenced. However, the
unique position of “appearance of corruption” in the campaign finance jurisprudence has more to do with the difficulties of proving
actual corruption, we think, than the importance of the state interest
in combating such negative perceptions.
Were the Supreme Court to exorcise the “appearance of corruption” state interest from the campaign finance jurisprudence, few
campaign finance regulations would pass constitutional scrutiny.
Antireformists might greet this development with cheer, but without
the fallback on appearances and perceptions, defenders of campaign
finance reforms would be left with the difficult job of proving that (1)
campaign contributions have actually corrupted representatives, and
(2) antibribery laws are insufficient to combat actual corruption. The
existence of the fallback state interest of preventing appearances allows judges to say that, while they think examples of actual corruption
justify the given reform, the existence of widespread appearances of
corruption removes all doubt.
Proving actual corruption is very difficult. Few systematic empirical studies of campaign finance have arrived at any firm conclusions
demonstrating that campaign finance contributions or expenditures
53
lead to concrete policy changes. This difficult empirical problem
arises, in part, from the nature of the counterfactual that needs to be
proven: to demonstrate that campaign finance contributions affect
policy outcomes, one must know what the policy outcomes would have

53

See DAVID B. MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE: CONCAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 78 (1990) (observing that “[w]hen studies
have found a relationship between campaign contributions and congressional voting,
the issues under deliberation tended to be low-visibility, nonpartisan ones”); FRANK J.
SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES 169 (1992) (describing the
finding that money buys a legislator’s time, although it does not necessarily buy her
vote); Donald Green, The Need for Federal Regulation of State Party Activity, in INSIDE THE
CAMPAIGN FINANCE BATTLE, supra note 3, at 97, 105 (acknowledging the lack of direct
evidence that campaign contributions affect legislators); Richard L. Hall & Frank W.
Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797, 798 (1990) (“[T]he scientific evidence that political
money matters in legislative decision making is surprisingly weak.”); Bradley A. Smith,
Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE
L.J. 1049, 1068 (1996) (explaining that “a substantial majority of those who have studied voting patterns on a systematic basis agree that campaign contributions affect very
few votes in the legislature”); Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality,
and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 58 (1997) (arguing that, although anecdotal
evidence and common sense support a connection between contributions and corruption, it is not supported by any systematic studies of voting records).
GRESSIONAL
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been in the absence of a given contribution. In other words, representatives can always say that they would have voted for a bill anyway,
even if supporters of the bill had not contributed large sums to their
campaigns. Moreover, contributors can always say that they direct
their money toward the election of politicians who already support
their causes, and not toward politicians whose minds they hope to
change. Very few smoking guns exist in the campaign finance world—
that is, examples where a politician publicly declares a position at time
t, receives a contribution at time t + 1, and then changes his position at
time t + 2.
54
Take, for example, the Marc Rich pardon scandal. No one doubts
that Marc Rich’s ex-wife gave considerable amounts of money to the
55
Democratic Party and the election campaigns of President Clinton.
However, how can one disprove the argument made by President
Clinton that the pardon was based on the merits of the case rather
56
than the influence of the campaign contributions? Of course, the
question could be settled by discovery of a letter from Denise Rich to
President Clinton that said: “I will give X number of dollars to your
campaign and the Democratic Party if you grant a pardon to my exhusband.” But such letters are almost never written and even more
57
rarely discovered. In any event, such quid pro quos are tantamount
to bribes and prohibited by the criminal law irrespective of the cam58
paign finance nature of the gift.
Examples of such activity present an appearance of impropriety,
however, even if they do not dispositively prove actual corruption.
54

This scandal is reported in Alison Leigh Cowan, Rich Pardon Reportedly Followed
Pledge to Charity of Former Wife, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2001, at A19; David Johnston & Marc
Lacey, Aides Say Clinton Ignored Pardon Advice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at A1.
55
See Johnston & Lacey, supra note 54, at A19 (reporting President Clinton’s
statement that his decision to pardon Rich was on the merits and not influenced by
contributions).
56
See id. (mentioning Ms. Rich’s $450,000 donation to the Clinton presidential
library).
57
In Montana Right to Life Ass’n v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003),
the court cited a letter from one state senator to his colleagues stating the following:
Please destroy this letter after reading. Why? Because the Life Underwriters
Association in Montana is one of the larger Political Action Committees in the
state, and I don’t want the demos to know about it! In the last election they
gave $8000 to state candidates. . . . Of this $8,000—Republicans got $7000—
you probably got something from them. This bill is important to the
underwriters and I have been able to keep the contributions coming our way.
In 1983, the PAC will be $15,000. Let’s keep it in our camp.
58
See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2003) (criminalizing the act of promising anything of value
to a public official in order to influence any official act).
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The reasonable observer would think that official decisions in line
with the desires of campaign contributors arise because of, rather than
despite, their campaign contributions. Emphasizing appearances does
not implicitly exonerate the recipient or the “system” from a charge of
actual corruption or undue influence. Rather, such an emphasis admits the difficulty of proof and relies on an assumed consensus that
certain correlated events are often causally related. The challenge in
proving appearances, then, should be to substantiate the likely effects
of an expenditure or contribution on an officeholder’s judgment.
That mode of analysis is a familiar one for judges, who often must decide whether a given relationship presents an appearance of impro59
priety or gives rise to a conflict of interest.
To set forth our argument succinctly, we take the position that the
appearance-of-corruption inquiry (if it is to be retained as a relevant
constitutional inquiry) should shift away from an analysis of popular
perceptions and toward an investigation of whether the regulated contribution or expenditure is likely to present undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment or behavior. This move derives both from our
assessment that the appearance inquiry serves principally as a means
to get around the difficult evidentiary problems posed by proving actual corruption, and from a conviction suggested in the next two sections that mass perceptions of corruption derive principally from attitudes unrelated to the problem of undue influence central to the case
law. While urging this shift in emphasis, we nevertheless must admit
that the state has a compelling interest in ensuring that campaign finance regulations or any set of laws prevent erosion of confidence in
the system of representative government. As pointed out earlier, we
too would prefer a state of affairs in which more Americans trust their
government rather than one in which most do not. However, we believe the available evidence casts doubt both on the notion that actions in the campaign finance system are related to that erosion of
confidence and on the argument that various recent reforms are
properly tailored toward restoring that confidence.

59

See generally ANDREW STARK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE
(2000) (cataloguing the many instances in American law where courts engage in a conflict-of-interest inquiry).
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II. THE LINK BETWEEN CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND
CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC MIND
Although this Article, in large part, criticizes the use of polls in
litigation to prove public perception of corruption, one must admit
that such perceptions are widespread and that most Americans view
campaign contributions and expenditures as corrupting. Indeed, as
the data presented in this Part suggest, Americans believe that campaign contributions, at any level, have too much influence over legislators, and a large majority of survey respondents will support virtually
any campaign finance reform proposal suggested to them. To support
60
these contentions, we present the data from McConnell v. FEC here
because the polls conducted for that case use the most recent data,
but comparable polls in other campaign finance cases would provide
nearly identical results.
We should note at the outset the disjuncture between public opinion and the jurisprudence on campaign finance. One should not be
surprised to learn that the nuances in the case law escape most re61
spondents to public opinion surveys concerning campaign finance.
Unlike the Supreme Court, for example, the public does not make a
distinction between campaign expenditures and contributions: both
are seen as corrupting or leading to undue influence. Nor can one
find in public opinion the Court’s fine distinctions among various political actors with respect to their potential for corruption. Although
public attitudes toward corporations are routinely less favorable than
toward other actors in the political system, the public does not distinguish between contributions from corporate treasuries, for example,
and those from corporate PACs. Indeed, few respondents probably
know exactly what a PAC is. The low salience that campaign finance
reform has in most Americans’ political calculations and most Americans’ lack of understanding about this complicated topic necessarily
create challenges in tapping opinions on these issues. In one poll that
asked voters five questions to tap their knowledge of campaign finance
law, less than 1% answered all five questions correctly and 88% an-

60

124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
See Declaration of Q. Whitfield Ayres at paras. 8-9, McConnell v. FEC, 251 F.
Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. 02-874) (“Substantial evidence supports the contention that public opinion about campaign finance regulations is shallow and poorly informed.”); Rebuttal Declaration of Q. Whitfield Ayres at para. 4a, McConnell v. FEC,
251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. 02-874) (“[T]he public has no clue about the
distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ money contributions.”).
61
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62

swered two or fewer of the questions correctly. And while polls repeatedly show a large number of people are dissatisfied with the political system, concerns about campaign finance are rarely voiced
63
(without prompting) as the source of that dissatisfaction.
Whereas public opinion may not reflect the Court’s nuanced
treatment of certain campaign finance questions, the sources of confusion in the case law cause similar confusion when placed in a public
opinion survey. Thus, a word like “corruption,” which has bedeviled
the various Justices who have struggled with Buckley and its progeny,
may also evoke different definitions and attitudes from survey respondents who are confronted with it. Therefore, surveys attempt to
measure “corruption” or “undue influence” in different ways—sometimes using the buzzwords familiar to the case law, and other times trying to get at similar or related concepts such as political efficacy or
trust in government.
Despite these shortcomings and qualifications, however, it is clear
from the available survey data that a large majority of Americans believes that campaign contributors exert substantial influence over office holders. As part of its defense of BCRA in McConnell v. FEC, the
Department of Justice submitted an expert report from Robert Shapiro, a professor of political science at Columbia University, who canvassed hundreds of polls from news organizations, polling firms, and
foundations to present findings concerning public opinion related to
64
corruption and campaign finance reform. The Department of Justice also commissioned its own survey from two polling firms, The
Mellman Group, Inc. and Wirthlin Worldwide, Inc., which conducted

62

Princeton Survey Research Associates, Money And Politics Survey (Apr. 1-24,
1997), at questions 22-24, available at http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/survey/s3.htm
(last accessed Oct. 13, 2004).
63
For example, one survey that found that 57% of Americans are dissatisfied with
“the way this country’s political system is working” found that only 9% of those who felt
dissatisfied said it was because of “‘Sleaze’/‘Politics’ of the system itself/tendency towards corruption” and only 5% said it was because “special interest groups are running
things.” Id. at questions 2, 3B.
64
See generally Robert Shapiro, Public Opinion & Campaign Finance (Sept. 18,
2002) (analyzing a series of opinion polls and surveys) (unpublished expert report)
(on file with University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Many of the polls referenced in
the footnotes to this Article come from the wonderful compilation provided in the Appendix to Shapiro’s report.
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65

a telephone poll of 1300 Americans. The pollsters asked a variety of
66
questions concerning the influence of donations to political parties.
The first question, and perhaps the point of departure for the
Mellman-Wirthlin poll, was: “How much impact do you think big contributions to political parties have on decisions made by the federal
government in Washington, D.C. . . . a great deal of impact, some, not
too much, or none at all, or don’t you have an opinion on this?” The
responses were as follows:
55% Great deal;
23% Some;
5% Not too much;
1% None at all;
67
16% Don’t have an opinion.
The survey evoked similar patterns of response for several questions attempting to tap the perceptions of campaign contributors’ influence. For example, 68% of respondents agreed that “big contributors to political parties sometimes block decisions by the federal
68
government . . . that could improve people’s everyday lives.”
And
84% agreed (51% “strongly” and 33% “somewhat”) that “Members of
Congress will be more likely to listen to those who give money to their
69
political party in response to solicitations for large donations.”
The survey also included a battery of questions specifically tailored
70
to the provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. Interviewers asked: “If an individual, issue group, corporation, or labor union
donated 50,000 dollars or more to the political party of a Member of
Congress, how likely would a Member of Congress be to give the
contributor’s opinion special consideration because of the contribution . . . ?” The responses were:

65

Mark Mellman & Richard Wirthlin, Research Findings of a Telephone Study
Among 1300 Adult Americans (Sept. 23, 2002) (unpublished survey results) (on file
with University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
66
Id. at 6-38.
67
Id. at 6.
68
Id. at 9.
69
Id. at 8.
70
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116
Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36, 47 U.S.C.).
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41% Very likely;
41% Somewhat likely;
6% Somewhat unlikely;
71
3% Very unlikely.
The survey garnered similar responses when the question was rephrased to substitute “paid for 50,000 dollars or more worth of political
ads on the radio or TV that benefited a Member of Congress” in place
of “donated 50,000 dollars or more to the political party of a Member
72
of Congress.”
To rebut these findings, the plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of BCRA commissioned their own study from Q. Whitfield
73
Ayres. Ayres did not dispute the results of the Mellman-Wirthlin survey per se—that is, he did not disagree that many Americans believe
“big” contributors to political parties gain influence over legislators.
Rather, he proved that the same patterns of response arose when one
substituted the hard money limits allowed by BCRA for the soft money
limits prohibited by them. In other words, he found that an overwhelming majority of Americans considered a $25,000 individual contribution to a party (allowed by BCRA) to be a “big” contribution that
74
could influence the vote or opinions of a member of Congress.
These results supported the conclusion, he argued, that BCRA “will
75
not reduce the appearance of corruption in American politics.”
There are some important distinctions between the surveys submitted by the opposing sides in McConnell v. FEC. For example, the
plaintiffs’ survey only asked about contributions by individuals and did
76
not include questions about corporations and unions. The Mellman
and Wirthlin study, as mentioned above, combined individuals, issue
77
groups, corporations and unions for several questions. However, the
point of the plaintiffs’ rebuttal survey was to demonstrate that the

71

Mellman & Wirthlin, supra note 65, at 9.
Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
73
See generally Rebuttal Declaration of Q. Whitfield Ayres, McConnell v. FEC, 251
F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. 02-874) (responding to the Wirthlin-Mellman survey by conducting a similar survey using the same methodology) (on file with University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
74
Id. at para. (3)(e)(iii).
75
Id. at para. (3)(f).
76
Id. at para. (3)(e)(iii).
77
Mellman & Wirthlin, supra note 65, at 9-11, 14-16, 19.
72
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same proportion of Americans consider activity BCRA permits as posing the same corruption threat as activity BCRA prohibits. So while it
may be the case that a large majority of Americans view the current
system as fostering corruption, they will continue to do so even in the
world of the new reforms.
To reframe the controversy between the McConnell experts in the
language of constitutional law: the state may have demonstrated the
existence of a compelling interest, but it failed to show that the chosen means were appropriately tailored to address that interest. For
purposes of adjudicating the constitutionality of BCRA, though, these
arguments may pass each other like ships in the night. The Court has
emphasized that campaign reforms need not be “scalpel-like” in their
precision when they seek to further the state interests in combating
78
corruption or its appearance. Perhaps Americans believe that contributions both beyond and within the limits of BCRA threaten to corrupt parties and candidates. The failure of Congress to set lower limits, however, can hardly be used to condemn the rationale justifying
the implementation of a less restrictive law. Indeed, by this logic,
Congress could not ban billion-dollar contributions so long as the
public was equally disturbed by million-dollar contributions.
Below the surface of this debate concerning BCRA’s underinclusiveness lurked a more serious criticism as to the nature of mass opinion concerning the influence of campaign contributors. The problem
with respect to perceptions of corruption may not be one of degree—
that Congress has failed to set limits low enough to address people’s
corruption fears. Rather, it might arise from a difference in kind—
that people register objections to campaign contributions, but their underlying concern is that some groups/institutions/individuals simply
have more influence than others do. Additional survey evidence sheds
light on this quandary. Between 1998 and 2002, a series of Gallup
polls asked the following question seeking to tap people’s resignation
to special interest influence:
Some people say major changes to the laws governing campaign finance
could succeed in reducing the power of special interests in Washington.
Other people say no matter what new laws are passed, special interests

78

See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391-392 (2000) (finding
that the state had sufficient evidence to justify the limitation imposed).
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will always find a way to maintain their power in Washington. Which
79
comes closer to your point of view?

The results appear in Table A.
Table A: Results from Gallup Poll Asking Whether
Campaign Finance Reform Could Succeed in
Reducing Special Interest Influence
Date of Poll

Major changes
could succeed
in reducing
power

Special
interests will
maintain
power

Neither/
Other

No
opinion

Feb. 8-10, 2002

28%

67%

1%

4%

Oct. 6-9, 2000

28%

64%

2%

6%

Mar. 20-22, 1998

31%

63%

2%

4%

About two-thirds of Americans consistently believe that “special interests” will maintain their power regardless of campaign finance regu80
lation. Of course, this resignation to the influence of special interests, even in the face of more restrictive campaign finance laws, does
not dampen enthusiasm for reform (indeed, any reform). Between
65% and 75% of Americans consistently favor new laws governing
campaign finance, with 40% saying such laws would be good for democracy, 36% saying they would not make much difference, and 13%
81
saying they would be bad for democracy.
A mixed picture thus emerges from the campaign finance-specific
polls that have been conducted. No one can dispute that the public
perceives a great deal of corruption and undue influence arising from
campaign contributions. Large majorities of Americans view cam79

USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll Results, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 2002, at question 14,
available at http://www.usatoday/com/news/2002-02-11-poll.htm (last accessed Oct.
13, 2004).
80
Polls that do not include the option of “special interests will maintain their
power” reveal substantial majorities that say campaign finance reform will be effective
at reducing special interest influence. For example, the ABC News-Washington Post
Poll asked: “Do you think stricter campaign finance laws would reduce the influence
of money in politics, or not? [If yes, ask:] Would it reduce it a lot or a just somewhat?”
Shapiro, supra note 64, at app. E, tbl.1.41. About 25% of respondents said such laws
would reduce it a lot, 38% said somewhat, 33% said it would not reduce influence, and
4% had no opinion. Id.
81
Gallup Org., Campaign Finance (2004), at http://www.gallup.com/content/
default.aspx?ci=1585 (last accessed Oct. 13, 2004).
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paign contributors as exercising undue influence over public policy
and the decision making of officeholders. They favor all forms of
campaign finance reform and believe such reforms would make government work better. However, equally large majorities believe that
contributions within the limits of BCRA will give their contributors
undue influence, and that special interests will maintain their power
regardless of new restrictions on campaign finance. Thus, for a court
adjudicating a challenge to a campaign finance regulation, ample evidence exists to suggest that contributions and independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate appear corrupt in the mind of a substantial majority of Americans. In other words, if we take the state
interest requirement of Buckley to mean that the state need only prove
that an appearance of corruption exists and the population perceives
it, then polls that indicate such an interest would probably be satisfied
for almost any restriction on contributions or expenditures.
The strongest counterargument to the reform position is not that
the public fails to perceive corruption, nor is it that the state has no
interest in combating those appearances. Rather, opponents of reform can point to evidence suggesting that these perceptions of undue influence are largely independent of anything occurring in the
campaign finance system. Thus, campaign finance reform, as it has
been envisioned to date, is unlikely to prevent erosion of “confidence
82
in the system of representative Government.” This argument undermines reformist claims of solvency or amelioration—in other
words, “tailoring” of the means to effectuate the state interest. The
question still remains, though, if perceptions of corruption are detached from events and regulations in the campaign finance system,
from where do these perceptions arise? Why do some people view
government officials as corrupt, and how can we explain these shifts in
aggregate public opinion over time?
III. EXPLAINING AND MEASURING PUBLIC ATTITUDES OF CORRUPTION
In public opinion, the notion of corruption is at least as multifaceted or open to different interpretations as it is for judges who hear
campaign finance cases. As a result, measuring feelings of corruption
may be as rich (or pointless) an enterprise as measuring people’s
“happiness,” “optimism” or “satisfaction.” Nevertheless, while recognizing the difficulties in defining corruption and measuring opinion
82

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting United States
Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).

2004]

PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION

145

concerning it, we should not thereby assume that nothing meaningful
can be said about why some people view government as corrupt and
why larger shares of the population hold such a view at particular
times. Interesting and sometimes unexpected patterns emerge—patterns that may be relevant to the campaign finance debate in the event
courts want to consider seriously whether certain reforms will have
measurable effects on aggregate public opinion about government.
We need to reiterate the caveats that began this Article, however.
Nothing in the foregoing analysis casts doubt on the basic finding that
Americans view the campaign finance system as corrupt, or on the legitimacy of the state’s interest in trying to address such perceptions.
Nor can the data we analyze support the inference we had hoped to
make: namely, that campaign finance reform has little effect on either individual perceptions of government corruption or shifts in the
share of the population that perceive such corruption. We are also
hamstrung by the questions that are included in surveys we analyze,
which do not include questions concerning campaign finance, and we
recognize that our model, such as it is, does not explain why many
Americans view government as corrupt. Nevertheless, we found several unexpected and interesting relationships between certain variables and perceptions of corruption. Those variables form a pattern
that suggests support for several alternative hypotheses that we think
cut away at the notions that activity in the campaign finance system is a
major contributor to Americans’ perception of government corruption, or that campaign finance reform will affect such perceptions.
A. How to Measure Attitudes of Corruption
The National Election Study (NES) has included three questions
in its survey that come close to tapping public opinion about corrup83
tion in government. None of these questions actually use the word
corruption, but this difference in wording may allow for more specific
conclusions as to trends in particular attitudes or components of the
vague concept of corruption. These three questions attempt to measure the public’s trust in government, the “crookedness” of people
running the government, and the influence of “big” interests:

83

See, e.g., Nat’l Election Studies, NES 2002 Post Election Survey Questions (2002), at
ftp://ftp.nes.isr.umich.edu/ftp/nes/studypages/2002prepost/2002prepost_qnaire
_post.htm (surveying approximately one thousand Americans on their political attitudes).
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Distrust: People have different ideas about the government in Washington. These ideas don’t refer to Democrats or Republicans in particular,
but just to the government in general. We want to see how you feel about
these ideas. . . . How much of the time do you think you can trust the
government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most
84
of the time, or only some of the time?
Crooked: Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of
85
them are crooked?
Special Interests: Would you say the government is pretty much run by a
few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the bene86
fit of all the people?

Figure 1 depicts the trends in responses to these questions since
1958. For the “crooked” question, the line represents those respondents who say “quite a few of the people running the government are
crooked.” For the “distrust” question, the line represents the percent
of respondents who say they can trust government “only some of the
time.” For the “special interests” question, the line represents those
respondents who say “government is pretty much run by a few big interests.” Although the questions may attempt to tap different attitudes, the lines rise and fall together, for the most part. As more people distrust government, more people also view government officials
as “crooked” and more people see government as run by a “few big interests.” To be sure, levels of distrust of government “to do what is
right” may reflect a lack of confidence in government efficiency or
ability to solve any problems. And beliefs in the crookedness of government officials may have more to do with government lying or Watergate-style nefariousness than with bribery or undue influence by
particular groups. And respondents who see government as “pretty
much run by a few big interests” may hold that belief because the alternative—“for the benefit of all”—seems unrealistic and utopian.

84
85
86

Id. at questions Q3, Q3a (emphasis omitted).
Id. at question Q6 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at question Q5 (emphasis omitted).
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Figure 1: Trends in Public Opinion of Government (1958-2002)
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With these caveats in mind, we can see, nevertheless, that public
opinion, as measured by these questions, has shifted significantly over
time and certain historical events or trends appear to accompany
these shifts. The percent of Americans who distrust government most
of the time has varied from a low of about 22% in 1964 to a high of
75% in 1994. The percent who see government as run by a “few big
interests” has varied from a low of 31% in 1964 to 76% in 1994. The
percent of Americans who think “quite a few people running the government are crooked” has varied from a low of 25% in 1958 to a high
of 51% in 1994. All three measures of public attitudes of corruption
rose in the late sixties and early seventies, dropped between 1980 and
1984, rose relatively steadily between 1984 and 1994, and have been
dropping ever since.
B. Explaining Trends in Public Perception of Corruption
Some seat-of-the-pants explanations for these trends jump out
88
from the data. With the Vietnam War, the struggle for civil rights,
87

This data is compiled from Nat’l Election Studies, NES TIME-SERIES DATA (2002)
[hereinafter NES DATASET], available at http://www.umich.edu/~nes/studyres/
download/nesdatacenter.htm (last accessed Oct. 13, 2004).
88
The most recent Pew Center study of trust in government makes many of these
arguments. See How Americans View Government: Deconstructing Distrust, Pew Research
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and the general tumult of the late sixties, it is unsurprising to see a
jump in the share of people with low regard for government according to these measures. The steep climb at the time of Watergate is
dramatic but also unsurprising. Afterwards, the trend line plateaus or
even recedes a bit during the early years of the Carter administration,
but with stagflation and the Iran hostage crisis in 1980 came a rise in
the lines to the highest point until that time. The economic recovery
during the first Reagan years correlated with a decline in feelings of
distrust, crookedness, and undue special interest influence, but such
feelings began to ascend once again during the Iran-Contra affair and
through the first two years of the first Bush administration. Feelings
of distrust and crookedness drop briefly during the time of the first
Iraq war, but they reach their highest point two years into the Clinton
administration, at the time of the 1994 Republican Revolution. However, the share of the population registering these antigovernment
feelings had been dropping steadily since 1994—that is, until Congress passed BCRA. In the first polls taken since BCRA’s passage the
share of the population that distrusts government climbed thirteen
points to 59% and the share of the population that views government
89
as run by a “few big interests” rose thirteen points to 64%.
As Figure 2 points out, the steady decline until 2002 occurred despite the explosion of soft money over the same period. The share of
the population registering feelings of distrust declined thirty points,
from 77% in 1994 to 46% in 2002, the share registering feelings of
special interest influence dropped from 76% in 1994 to 51% in 2002,
and the share believing quite a few government officials were crooked
declined from 51% in 1994 to 28% in 2002. Over the same period,
soft money contributions went up fivefold—from about $100 million
to over $500 million. Ironically, the elimination of soft money has
been followed by a marked increase in the two available measures of
opinions concerning government corruption. The share of the population that distrusts government and the share of the population that
thinks government is run by a “few big interests” has climbed by thirteen percentage points between 2002 and 2004. Of course, we would

Ctr. for the People & the Press (Mar. 10, 1998) (concluding that distrust of government is connected to how people feel about the country generally), available at
http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=95 (last accessed Oct. 13,
2004).
89
Views of the Parties, CBS News/N.Y. Times Poll (July 11-15, 2004), at questions
q30-q31, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/CBSNews_polls/parties_views.pdf
(last accessed Oct. 13, 2004).
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not be so bold as to suggest that passage of BCRA caused an increase in
perceptions of corruption. (Indeed, we suspect the Iraq war and a
sluggish economy were the principal contributors to that trend.)
However, we cannot help noting that the trends in these measures are
90
exactly the opposite of what reformers might expect.
Figure 2: The Rise of Soft Money and the Drop in
91
Perception of Corruption (1992-2002)
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C. Does Corruption Lie in the Eye of the Beholder?: The Demographic,
Political and Attitudinal Correlates to Perception of Corruption
Arguments as to why aggregate opinion has shifted over time do
not necessarily help explain why some individuals are more likely than

90

We had hoped to develop a regression model with the share of the population
perceiving corruption as the dependent variable. However, presidential approval and
these measures of corruption are so highly correlated that it cannot be included in the
regression. As with the individual level variables we describe later, the share of the
population that believes the economy has gotten worse over the previous year is a statistically significant predictor of the share of the population perceiving corruption.
However, the high correlation between presidential approval and aggregate feelings of
corruption supports the narrative in the text. Events such as the Vietnam War, the
wars in Iraq, economic recessions and recoveries, and scandals, such as Watergate and
Iran-Contra, affect the overall share of the American people who deem government
corrupt.
91
NES DATASET, supra note 87.
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others to perceive government as corrupt. However, in many respects,
this may be the more interesting and answerable question: why are
some types of people more likely to say that “quite a few people running the government are crooked” or that “government is pretty much
92
run by a few big interests looking out for themselves?”
We begin with several hypotheses that we hope will explain some
of the variation among people in their responses to these questions.
The unifying argument behind these hypotheses is the following: respondents who are unhappy with their position in society, with the incumbents who run the government, or with government or people in
general are more likely to deem government corrupt. Expressions of
antigovernment feeling—that those running the government are
crooked or unduly influenced—are often rooted in multiple sources
of personal and political dissatisfaction. For the most part, these
sources of dissatisfaction are either intractable or reactive to macropolitical trends, such as the state of the economy or the performance
of the incumbent President. We categorize these sources of dissatisfaction into three rough groupings: demography (race, income, education, age), opinions as to the current state of affairs (presidential
approval, opinion of the economy), and social-psychological predispositions (opinions concerning big business, government waste, tax rate
fairness, and interpersonal trust).
The first hypothesis might be described as the “out-group” hypothesis: we expect individuals of lower socioeconomic status and individuals who feel that the political system has given them a raw deal

92

We do not analyze distrust because others have ably done so, and we think the
question fails to tap the particular issue of undue influence that frames the campaign
finance debate. See generally CRITICAL CITIZENS: GLOBAL SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT (Pippa Norris ed., 1999) (surveying trends in international support for
representative democracy); WHY PEOPLE DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT (Joseph S. Nye,
Jr. et al. eds., 1997) (collecting ten essays addressing the recent decline in popular confidence in government); Jack Citrin & Donald Philip Green, Presidential Leadership and
the Resurgence of Trust in Government, 16 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 431 (1986) (explaining a perceived resurgence in public trust in government); Jack Citrin & Christopher Muste,
Trust in Government, in MEASURES OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES (John P. Robinson et al.
eds., 1999) (reviewing the measures of trust in government that have been applied);
Jack Citrin, Comment, The Political Relevance of Trust in Government, 68 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 973 (1974) (discussing the need for empirical data on the effect of public distrust
on the effectiveness of government); Primo, Public Opinion and Campaign Finance: Reformers Versus Reality, supra note 3, at 213-17 (examining the link between campaign
contributions and trust in government). For an excellent review of the literature on
trust in government, see Margaret Levi & Laura Stoker, Political Trust and Trustworthiness, 3 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 475, 476-85 (2000) (reviewing survey data both in the
United States and in other countries).
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to blame government, in part, for their position, and therefore deem
it corrupt. Naturally, we would expect those groups with less political
power to be somewhat more antigovernment than those with power,
and that these feelings of powerlessness would translate into expressions of opinion that those running the government are crooked or
unduly influenced by a few big interests.
Derived from the respondents’ opinions as to the current state of
affairs, the second hypothesis might be described as the “sour grapes”
hypothesis: we expect to find that those who have lost out in the political system or who are otherwise unhappy with incumbent performance will express their dissatisfaction by deeming government corrupt.
As with out-groups whose relative position in the socioeconomic hierarchy may translate into antigovernment attitudes expressed through
perceptions of corruption, those who already hold negative opinions
as to the state of the nation will similarly express their dissatisfaction
and blame those in charge. Therefore, we expect presidential disapproval and poor retrospective evaluations of the economy to correlate
with the perception of corruption.
The third hypothesis, the “libertarian-populist” hypothesis, suggests that individuals who are suspicious of government, in general,
tend to believe that the government—at any given time—is corrupt.
We try to tap into this political predisposition by analyzing opinions
concerning government waste, tax rate fairness and big business. We
expect to find that some people are simply against “big government”
and believe that government is almost by nature corrupt. Unlike the
previous set of variables, these opinions, we surmise, are more resistant to change. In other words, some people will believe government
is corrupt no matter how well government performs. Such respondents adhere to the belief that all politicians are crooks, no matter
which crooks happen to be in power at the time, or whether they are
doing a good job or not.
Finally, we test whether those who view government as corrupt
also view people as corrupt. If true, this adds some support to a “cynicism hypothesis”: people who are naturally mistrusting of others will
be more likely to mistrust government and call it corrupt. By analyzing questions that tap into interpersonal trust, we examine the contention that cynics who inevitably question people’s motives or regard
people as generally selfish may be more likely to view government as
crooked or unduly influenced by a few interests. Just as some people
may be of the opinion that all politicians are crooks, some may believe
that most people are crooked. Therefore, perception of government

152

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 153: 119

corruption may be merely one manifestation of a cynical worldview
that people, in general, cannot be trusted to act in public spirited or
other-regarding ways.
For defenders of current reform efforts, we may be leaving out the
most important potential explanation for perceptions of corruption.
After all, the “good government” hypothesis suggests that some phenomenon in the political system—either in the form of apparent undue influence of campaign contributors or perhaps outright bribery—
translates into public perception of corruption. We set forth the alternative hypotheses here, however, to chip away at the “good government” hypothesis: they offer a different source for people’s beliefs
in government corruption. That said, we should reiterate that nothing in the graphs, tables, or regressions that follow undermines the
basic conclusion of the polls discussed earlier in this Article. We do
not disprove the contention that Americans view politicians as corrupted by campaign contributions or that Americans view the campaign finance system as “corrupt.” Rather, we suggest that Americans’
93
“confidence in the system of representative government” —specifically, their beliefs that government officials are not “crooked” and that
government is “run for the benefit of all”—is, to a large extent, related
to their position in society, their general tendency to trust others,
their philosophy as to what government should do, and their ideological or philosophical disagreement with the policies of those in charge.
We present graphs here that are most illustrative of our argument.
We alternate between graphs for the “crooked” question and the “few
big interests” question while noting in the text instances where the
same relationship does not exist for both questions. We have provided in the Appendix multivariate analyses for all the variables dis94
cussed here for both the “crooked” and “few big interest” questions.
For the most part, the models for the two questions are similar. We
have presented the regressions in two formats in the Appendix: first,
95
as a model derived from the entire NES Dataset since 1964 and sec96
ond, as separate regressions for each year in the survey.

93

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting United States
Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
94
See infra apps. A-D (providing the coefficients produced from logistic regression
of the NES Dataset results concerning “crookedness” and special interest influence).
95
See infra apps. A, B.
96
See infra apps. C, D.
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1. The Demography of Corruption Attitudes
If the “out-group” hypothesis is true, then we should expect individuals of certain demographic characteristics to be more likely than
others to express the view that government is corrupt. When we break
down the survey universe according to race, income, education, and
age, we find limited support for this contention. With respect to race,
we find that African Americans are more likely than whites to believe
government officials are crooked and, all else equal, to view government as run by a few big interests. Figure 3, which breaks down the
“crooked” question according to race, shows that the racial difference
was most pronounced during the Nixon and Ford administrations. In
1972, before the Watergate scandal, the difference was the greatest
with 65% of African Americans, but only 35% of Whites, deeming
government officials crooked. (The trends are not as stark for the
“few big interests” question.) Since then, a larger share of the African
American population has consistently viewed government officials as
crooked, but the difference has shrunk to almost nothing in recent
years. As displayed in the Appendix, in multivariate analysis of the
combined NES Dataset for all years where the questions were asked,
race is statistically significant for the “crooked” question, but that may
be due largely to the gap between blacks and whites in the 1970s. The
aggregate regressions for the “few interests” question demonstrate that
race is not statistically significant once we control for presidential disapproval.
Education and income exhibit a similar relationship to perceptions of corruption. The share of college graduates who view government officials as crooked is consistently lower than the share of noncollege graduates. The difference was the greatest in 1996 when 57%
of those without a college education viewed government officials as
crooked, while only 34% of college grads responded as such, as Figure
4 depicts. The difference is less stark, once again, for the “few big interests” question, in which education is statistically insignificant in the
aggregate regressions.
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Figure 3: Race and Perceptions of “Crookedness” of
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Figure 4: Education and Perceptions of “Crookedness” of
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A similar pattern emerges with respect to income. As Figure 5
demonstrates, a smaller share of the richest third of Americans has
consistently claimed government was crooked and the same pattern
holds for the “few big interests” question. The lines on the graphs indicate the respondents’ income percentiles. The line at the bottom of
the graphs—indicating a lower share who believe government is
crooked or run by a few interests—for most of the history of the question represents respondents within the top five income percentiles.
Income is also significant in the aggregate regressions for both questions: the richer you are (all else being equal) the less likely you are to
view government as corrupt.
Figure 5: Income and Perceptions of “Crookedness” of
99
Government (1958-2002)
70

0-16
60

17-33
34-67

50

68-95

Percent

95-100
40

30

20

10

0
1958

1962

1966

1970

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

1998

2002

Year

Age appears to be a bit trickier. For some reason, age is significant in aggregate regressions for both questions but the signs go in
opposite directions. In other words, the older you are, the less likely
you are to view government as crooked, but the more likely you are to
view government as run by a few big interests. We found the same pattern for cohort groups, although we do not present the data here.
Earlier generations are less likely than more recent generations to
view government as crooked, but more likely to view it as run by a few

99

Id. The line in Figure 5 designates the income percentile of respondents.
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interests. It may be that earlier cohorts are less likely to cast an aspersion at government officials by calling them “crooked”—a word that
some might even view as unpatriotic—but are more likely to have resigned themselves to the reality that government will be controlled by
a few interests.
There seems to be some support for the “out-group” hypothesis:
African Americans, the poor, and the less educated are more likely to
view government as corrupt. In fact, we were surprised not to find
more of an effect from these demographic factors. Nevertheless, the
relationship between these variables and our measures of corruption
perceptions are consistent with a theory grounded in the predispositions of the perceiver, rather than changes in what is perceived. Some
groups of people, because of their position in the socioeconomic hierarchy, are somewhat more likely to view government as corrupt.
2. The Politics of Corruption Attitudes
Although we find some support for the “out-group” hypothesis, a
person’s political attitudes are often a more powerful predictor of
whether she views government as corrupt. Consistent with the theme
that dislike of those in power translates into perceptions of corruption, we would expect political opponents of those in power to view
government as corrupt. We find some support for the “sour grapes”
hypothesis in the data when we examine the correlation between perceptions of corruption and respondents’ partisanship, opinion of the
sitting President, and opinion concerning the performance of the
economy over the previous year.
Opinion of the sitting President is one of the best predictors of
perceptions of corruption. As Figure 6 illustrates, those who disapprove of the way the President is handling his job are more likely than
those who approve to view government as corrupt. Here we display
the results for the “few big interests” question, but the results are
equally robust for the “crooked” question. The variable remains significant in multivariate analysis as well, although as the Appendix indicates the NES survey only began including the presidential approval
100
Nevertheless, the consistent trend since 1972 is
question in 1972.

100

See infra apps. C, D. We should make clear one point that is obscured by these
graphs and several of the others in this subsection: the lines do not take into account
the relative sizes of the populations who approve and who disapprove of the way the
President is handling his job. In other words, a doubling of the number of people who
disapprove of the President will not be revealed on these graphs; the graphs only indi-
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clear: those who approve of the way the President is handling his job
are less likely to consider government as crooked or run by a few big
interests. The gap was greatest on the crooked question in 1972, when
57% of those who disapproved of the President considered government officials crooked, while only 31% of those who approved of the
101
President registered the same response. While it has never reached
that great a disparity since 1972, there is a consistent ten-point difference on the “crooked” question between those who approve and those
who disapprove of the job the President is doing. As Figure 6 depicts,
the difference between “approvers” and “disapprovers” on the “few interests” question is even more stark. In 1972, 1984, and 2002—elections in which the incumbent Republican President was incredibly
popular but disliked by his opponents—the margins between those
who disapproved and those who approved of the President were 33,
28, and 26 percentage points respectively.
Figure 6: Presidential Job Approval and Perceptions of
102
Special Interest Influence (1972-2002)
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cate the share of “approvers” or “disapprovers” that believe government is crooked or
run by a few big interests.
101
NES DATASET, supra note 87.
102
Id. Respondents were asked if they approved or disapproved of the way that
[the current President] was handling his job as President.
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Of course, it is possible that respondents disapprove of the President’s job performance precisely because they believe he is crooked or
beholden to a few big interests. Even if the causal arrow moves in that
direction, however, we learn from these graphs how views of the
President, individually, affect questions about government corruption
generally. Keep in mind that the questions ask whether “quite a few of
the people running the government are crooked” and whether “gov103
Even if all we
ernment is pretty much run by a few big interests.”
learn from these graphs is that one’s opinion of the President shapes
one’s views concerning government corruption more generally, then
we have still learned that public perception of corruption may be unrelated to the sum total of corruption in government more generally
(for example, in the Congress or in the states). Even granting that
some respondents’ low approval of the President in certain years may
derive from feelings that he is corrupt, it is somewhat surprising to see
such a strong and consistent relationship over various years. This is
especially true for the “few big interests” question, as noted in Appendix D, wherein presidential approval is always statistically significant,
except in 1994, 1996, and 2000. Even if the relationship between
these two opinions is mutually reinforcing, such a relationship still
adds support to our general argument that attitudes about incumbent
job performance and about government corruption are one and the
same. With that said, the other variables we analyze add credence to
the story that those who disapprove of the job the President is doing
register their dissatisfaction by painting government with the broad
brush of “crookedness” or undue influence.
The relationship between the respondents’ partisan affiliation and
perception of corruption bolsters the argument that individuals are
predisposed to see corruption in those whom they already dislike. As
Figure 7 depicts, a greater share of those identifying themselves as
“Strong Democrats” believe “government is run by a few big interests”
when Republicans hold the Presidency than when Democrats do, and
self-described “Strong Republicans” register the opposite pattern of
opinion. During the Nixon, Ford, Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, and G.W.
Bush administrations, a greater percentage of Democrats than Republicans considered quite a few government officials “crooked” and gov104
Conversely, during the
ernment as run by a “few big interests.”

103

NES 2002 Post Election Survey Questions, supra note 83, at questions Q5, Q6 (emphasis omitted).
104
NES DATASET, supra note 87.
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Johson, Carter, and Clinton administrations, a greater share of Republicans than Democrats viewed government officials as “crooked” and
government as run by a “few big interests.” Although the relationship
105
is most stark among strong partisans, membership in the President’s
party is negatively correlated with perceptions of corruption according
to our two measures. However, once we include presidential approval
in the model, the party affiliation variable loses statistical significance
for the crooked question, both in the aggregate regression and regression by years. It remains statistically significant in the aggregate regressions for the “few big interests” question and for the yearly regressions for 1976 and 1984, but it is not statistically significant for any
other year once presidential approval data is added. In other words,
respondents’ partisanship is generally a good predictor of whether
they perceive corruption, but the statistical significance of partisanship
is subsumed by presidential approval.

105

While the strongest partisans (that is, those who identify themselves as Strong
Democrats and Strong Republicans) usually differ in their perceptions of corruption
according to expectations, we did not find that the strength of party identification is
directly related to one’s propensity to perceive corruption. In other words, as one gets
more Republican—moving from Strong Democrat to Weak Democrat to Independent
Democrat to Pure Independent to Independent Republican to Weak Republican to
Strong Republican—one does not necessarily become more likely to perceive corruption in government while a Democratic president is running the country. In the 1990s,
for example, sometimes the share of Independents who viewed government as corrupt
was greater than the share of Democrats or Republicans who viewed government that
way. From this, one might expect that strength of party identification has some relationship to perceptions of corruption. In other words, perhaps partisans feel a greater
stake in the system and therefore are less likely to malign it with charges of corruption,
while independents are alienated and more likely to charge any party controlling the
government with corruption. However, we did not find any support for this hypothesis
when party strength was added to the regressions.
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Figure 7: Extreme Partisanship and Perceptions of Special
106
Interest Influence (1964-2002)
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To add credence to this theory that perception of corruption may
have little to do with perceptions of undue influence and more to do
with dissatisfaction with the state of the world, we can examine the results of a question that does not mention government at all. Since
1980, the NES survey has asked people to evaluate the performance of
the economy over the previous year: “[W]ould you say that over the
past year the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed about the
107
same, or gotten worse? Figure 8 presents data for the “few big interests” question, but comparable trends appear with respect to the
“crooked” question. Consistently, those who view the economy as having gotten worse are more likely to consider government corrupt according to both questions, even though, as in recent years, the margin
is sometimes not terribly great. Why might this be? Well, the “good
government” hypothesizers might suggest that those who view the
economy unfavorably attribute it to government corruption, but that
idea seems implausible. Rather, the more likely explanation is that
those who are unhappy with the performance of the economy some-

106

NES DATASET, supra note 87.
Nat’l Election Studies, NES 2002 Pre Election Survey Questions (2002), at question H1, at ftp://ftp.nes.isr.umich.edu/ftp/nes/studypages/2002prepost/2002prepost
_qnaire_pre.htm.
107
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times vent their displeasure and displace their anger onto the government, deeming officials crooked or as unduly influenced. In 1990,
for example, 79% of those who viewed the economy as having gotten
worse over the previous year said government is run by a few big interests, whereas only 52% of those who viewed the economy as having
gotten better voiced the same response. In other years, however, the
gap was much smaller, perhaps because performance of the economy
was not a particularly salient or divisive issue, although the order of
the lines from top to bottom maintains the same pattern. In the aggregate regressions, evaluations of the economy remain statistically
significant even when presidential approval and partisanship are
added.
Figure 8: Evaluation of the Performance of the Economy over the
Previous Year and Perceptions of Special Interest Influence
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Presidential approval, partisanship, and opinions on economic
performance are correlated with each other, but the relationship of
each of these variables to our dependent variables supports the argument that perspectives on incumbents translate into attitudes about
government corruption. In other words, we tend to see corruption in
108

NES DATASET, supra note 87. Respondents were asked, “Would you say that
over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed about the same or
gotten worse?”
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those whom we are predisposed to dislike or oppose, and when we are
displeased with the current state of affairs, we tend to lash out by saying government is corrupt. Like the “out-group” hypothesis, the “sour
grapes” hypothesis is predicated on a notion that individuals translate
a generalized negative affect toward those running the government
into a particularized expression describing government as corrupt.
3. Attitudes Toward “Big Government” and
Perception of Corruption
Thus far, we have found some support for the notion that those
who have lost out in the political system, either historically or temporarily, are more likely to view government as corrupt. Yet the “libertarian-populist” hypothesis suggests that something more than victimization or sour grapes explains Americans’ perceptions of government
corruption. For some, government, almost by definition, may be corrupt, and the “bigger” government gets the more corrupt it becomes.
One question that suggests some support for this idea is: “Do you
think that people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in
109
taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much of it?” As Figure 9
suggests, views of government waste correlate strongly with percep110
tions of corruption.
Roughly 40% to 60% of those who think government wastes a lot of money that we pay in taxes answer that quite a
few people running the government are crooked, while only 10% to
30% of those who see little waste answer similarly. A similar twenty to
thirty percentage-point gap exists for the “few interests” question.

109

NES 2002 Post Election Survey Questions, supra note 83, at question Q4 (emphasis
omitted).
110
Indeed, this variable is the most predictive of all that we analyzed.
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Figure 9: Perceptions of Government Waste and Perceptions of
111
“Crookedness” of Government (1958-2002)
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A series of recent questions on taxation provides additional evidence that feelings about government, in general, correlate with perceptions of corruption, in particular. The 2002 NES Survey asked respondents whether they paid too much, too little, or just the right
112
It also asked respondents for their opinion as to
amount in taxes.
whether the rich and the poor paid too much, too little or just the
113
right amount in taxes.
As Table B below demonstrates, consistent
with the “libertarian-populist” hypothesis, respondents who believe
they pay “more than they should” in taxes are more likely to believe
that quite a few people running the government are crooked and that
114
About 35% of those who
government is run by a few big interests.
say they pay more than they should in taxes believe that quite a few
people running the government are crooked, whereas only 20% of
those who think they pay the right amount say quite a few are
crooked. The findings are similar for the few interests questions: 58%

111

NES DATASET, supra note 87. Respondents were asked if people in the government waste a lot of money paid in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much
of it.
112
NES 2002 Post Election Survey Questions, supra note 83, at question M9a.
113
Id. at questions M9b, M9c.
114
The numerical data displayed in Table B, infra, is contained within the NES
DATASET, supra note 87.
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of those who say they pay too much in taxes, but only 44% of those
who say they pay the right amount, respond that government is run by
a “few big interests.”
Table B: Opinion on Tax Rate Fairness and
Perception of Corruption
Percent
responding that
“Quite a few
people running
the government
are crooked”
(N)

Percent
responding that
“Not many or
hardly any
people running
the government
are crooked”
(N)

Percent
responding that
“Government is
run by a few big
interests
looking out for
themselves”
(N)

Percent
responding that
“Government is
run for the
benefit of all”
(N)

Respondent
pays more
than s/he
should

35.4 (211)

64.6 (385)

58.1 (334)

41.9 (241)

Respondent
pays just the
right amount
in taxes

19.6 (133)

80.4 (545)

43.6 (286)

56.4 (370)

Respondent
pays less
than s/he
should

48.6 (17)

51.4 (18)

50.0 (16)

50.0 (16)

The rich pay
more than
they should

28.5 (51)

71.5 (128)

45.8 (76)

54.2 (90)

The rich pay
just the right
amount

20.0 (92)

80.0 (369)

42.1 (185)

58.0 (256)

The rich pay
less than
they should

32.4 (215)

67.6 (448)

58.1 (379)

41.9 (273)

The poor
pay more
than they
should

33.3 (185)

66.7 (371)

60.1 (325)

39.9 (216)

The poor
pay just the
right amount

21.1 (134)

78.9 (500)

42.3 (257)

57.7 (350)

The poor
pay less than
they should

35.1 (34)

64.9 (63)

48.5 (47)

51.5 (50)

These feelings concerning tax policy are not limited to one’s perception of one’s own tax rate, however. Those who believe the rich
pay too little in taxes or the poor pay too much are also more likely to
view government as corrupt according to the two measures. Thirty-
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two percent of those who say the rich pay less than they should in
taxes, as compared to 20% of those who say the rich pay just the right
amount, say quite a few people running government are crooked.
Roughly 58% of those who say the rich pay less than they should in
taxes, as compared to 42% of those who say the rich pay just the right
amount, say government is run by a few big interests. In other words,
those who believe the rich are not paying their fair share are somewhat more likely to believe that government is crooked or run by a few
big interests. In contrast, those who see the poor as paying more than
they should in taxes are more likely to view government as corrupt.
About 33% of those who say the poor pay more than they should believe quite a few government officials are crooked, as compared to
21% of those who say the poor pay the right amount. The difference
is similar for the “few big interests” question: 60%, as compared to
42%, believe government is run by a “few big interests.”
Of course, adherents to the “good government” hypothesis might
offer the explanation that respondents view corruption as causing
government waste of tax dollars. In other words, campaign contributors, lobbyists, or bribers may exact concessions from the government
in the form of wasteful, pork-barrel spending. A corrupt government,
under this view, naturally wastes money as it pays off those who unduly
influence it. For similar reasons, one might expect attitudes toward
taxation to be correlated with perceptions of corruption: respondents
may think their taxes and the taxes of the poor are too high especially
because those tax dollars go to a corrupt government. Likewise, under this view, respondents may perceive the rich as paying too little in
taxes precisely because they have successfully (and unduly) influenced
government to get lower tax rates. We cannot disprove these alternative, complicated explanations; all we can say is that our findings are
consistent with a theory that posits that a person’s perception of government corruption often correlates with her feelings as to how government raises and spends its money.
The “libertarian-populist” might not only be suspicious of government, but of other large and powerful institutions as well. We find,
for example, that respondents’ opinions about big business also correlate with their responses to the questions attempting to tap opinions
of government corruption. Those who consider quite a few government officials corrupt or view government as run by a few big interests
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115

give a lower “feeling thermometer” rating to “big business.” Figure
10 separates respondents according to their “feeling thermometer”
rating of “big business.” Those who feel “warm” toward “big business”
are less likely to view government as corrupt. The differences in the
2002 survey are dramatic, as Figure 10 depicts. For example, only
21% of those who give a “feeling thermometer” rating for big business
between 76 and 100 degrees view government as run by a “few big interests,” whereas 72% of those who give “big business” a rating between 0 and 25 degrees believe government is run by a “few big inter116
ests.” Similar results are found for the crookedness question.
Perhaps those who see government as corrupt do so because they fear
power more generally. However, in fairness to the “good government”
hypothesizer, respondents who believe “big business” is bribing the
government will probably have a low opinion of both government and
“big business.”
Figure 10: Perceptions of Big Business and Perceptions of Special
117
Interest Influence (1964-2002)
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The “feeling thermometer” question asks respondents how warm they feel toward a particular group with 100 degrees being the warmest and most favorable and
zero being the coldest and least favorable. NES 2002 Post Election Survey Questions, supra
note 83, at questions D1, D2K.
116
NES DATASET, supra note 87.
117
NES DATASET, supra note 87. The line in this figure refers to respondents’ rating of big business on a feeling thermometer (0=cool; 100=warm).
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As a final piece of support for the hypothesis that one’s political
philosophy affects specific opinions about government corruption, we
have included “feeling thermometer” ratings for “the poor” and “peo118
The magnitude of the effect of these variables is
ple on welfare.”
slight, though often statistically significant. The fascinating result
from these two variables, however, is that “warm” feelings toward the
“poor” and “warm” feelings toward “people on welfare” correlate differently with attitudes of corruption. The warmer respondents feel
toward the poor, the more likely they are to perceive government as
corrupt. However, the warmer they feel toward “people on welfare,”
the less likely they are to view government as corrupt. How can we explain this? On the one hand, those who support or express positive
feelings toward an out-group (that is, the poor) tend to view government as corrupt. On the other hand, when respondents are primed to
think about the poor in terms of a government program or subsidy
(that is, as people on welfare), the “libertarian-populist” streak presents itself. Those voters who are in favor of such big government programs view government as less corrupt, but those who are against welfare view government as more corrupt. Again, the magnitude of the
effect is tiny, but the differences between the two variables add credence to our theory that one’s attitudes about government corruption
can be a function of one’s feeling about “big government,” as opposed
119
to undue influence.

118

These values can be found in the aggregate regressions by individual years, infra apps. C, D.
119
As this article went to press we discovered some other variables from the NES
Survey that bolster the libertarian-populist hypothesis and that are statistically significant in regressions for the “few big interests” question. The NES has asked: “Some
people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job
and a good standard of living. . . . Others think the government should just let each
person get ahead on their own. . . . Where would you place yourself on this scale . . . ?”
Nat’l Election Studies, NES 2004 Pre-Election Survey Questionnaire (Sept. 8, 2004) at question N5, N5a (emphasis omitted), at ftp://ftp.nes.isr.umich.edu/ftp/nes/
studypages/2004prepost/2004prepost_qnaire_post.htm. The NES has also asked:
“Some people think the government should provide fewer services even in areas such
as health and education in order to reduce spending. . . . Other people feel that it is
important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. . . . Where would you place yourself on this scale . . . ?” Id. at questions N1, N1a (emphasis omitted). Those who believe government should “just let
each person get ahead on his/her own” and those who believe the government should
“provide fewer services” are more likely to believe government is run by a “few big interests.” NES DATASET, supra note 87. The same can be said for those who are against
military spending. The NES has asked: “Some people believe that our armed forces
are already powerful enough and that we should spend less money for defense. Others
feel that military spending should at least continue at the present level. How do you
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4. Perception of Government Corruption as a Species of
Interpersonal Distrust
That fear and distrust of government translate into perceptions of
corruption is less surprising than the correlation between distrust of
people and such perceptions. If we can demonstrate that those who
believe people are corrupt also tend to view government as corrupt,
then we have come a long way toward an explanation that perceptions
of government corruption arise more from the predispositions of the
perceiver than from what exactly she is perceiving. Moreover, if perceptions of government corruption have such deep psychological
roots, then changes in government campaign finance policy are unlikely to have much of an effect on the subclass of people who are almost hard-wired to see the worst in others, including those running
the government.
In selected years, the NES has asked questions attempting to tap
respondents’ perception of the trustworthiness of other people. As
presented in Table C for the 2002 survey and in the regressions in the
Appendix for selected years, we find a strong and consistent relationship between individuals’ responses to these questions concerning interpersonal trust and the likelihood that an individual will believe that
quite a few people running the government are crooked or government is run by a few big interests. The three NES questions appear
120
below, followed by Table C, which presents the 2002 data:
1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or
121
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?
2. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that
122
they are just looking out for themselves?
3. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they
123
got the chance or would they try to be fair?

feel?” Nat’l Elections Studies, The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior:
Military Spending (1) 1972-1976, at http://www.umich.edu/~nes/nesguide/toptable/
tab4d_3a.htm (last accessed Oct. 13, 2004). Those who are against military spending
also tend to believe government is run by a “few big interests.” NES DATASET, supra
note 87.
120
The data in Table C, infra, is available at the NES DATASET, supra note 87.
121
NES 2002 Post Election Survey Questions, supra note 83, at question K2 (emphasis
omitted).
122
Id. at question K5 (emphasis omitted).
123
Id. at question K4 (emphasis omitted).

2004]

169

PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION

Table C: Trust in People and Perception of
Government Corruption (2002)
Percent
responding that
“Quite a few
people running
the government
are crooked”
(N)

Percent
responding that
“Not many or
hardly any people
running the
government are
crooked” (N)

Percent
responding that
“Government is
run by a few big
interests looking
out for
themselves” (N)

Percent
responding that
“Government is
run for the
benefit of all”
(N)

“Most people
can be trusted”

19.4 (142)

80.6 (591)

46.0 (323)

54.0 (379)

“Can’t be too
careful in
dealing with
people”

37.7 (219)

62.3 (362)

56.5 (320)

43.5 (246)

“Most of the
time people try
to be helpful”

21.0 (100)

79.0 (376)

43.8 (204)

56.2 (262)

“They are
mostly looking
out for
themselves”

50.5 (94)

49.5 (92)

65.2 (118)

34.8 (63)

“Most people
would try to be
fair”

20.4 (101)

79.6 (393)

49.6 (234)

50.4 (238)

“Most people
would try to
take advantage
of you if they
got a chance”

41.9 (67)

58.1 (93)

57.8 (89)

42.2 (65)

As with Table B, here we compare the propensity of cynics and
non-cynics to respond that government is corrupt. For each question,
we find that the percentage of cynics who view government as corrupt
is greater than the percentage of non-cynics who view government as
corrupt. For example, only 19% of those who say “most people can be
trusted” believe quite a few people running the government are
crooked, while 38% of those who say that “you can’t be too careful in
dealing with people” believe quite a few people running the government are crooked—an eighteen-point gap. Similar relationships exist
for the few interests question. About 44% of those who say “most of
the time people try to be helpful” believe that government is run by a
few big interests, whereas 65% of those who say people “are just looking out for themselves” believe government is run by a few big interests—a twenty-one point gap.
As the regressions in the appendices depict, one of the most consistent and reliable predictors of respondents’ propensity to answer
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“crooked” and “few big interests” is their answer to the question: “Do
you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got
124
the chance or would they try to be fair?” Someone who answers that
“most people would try to take advantage of you” is twice as likely as
one who says “they would try to be fair” to say that “quite a few people
running the government are crooked,” or “government is run by a few
big interests.” This relationship is as true today as it was when the
question was first asked in the 1960s. Respondents who are suspicious
of other people’s motives, who tend to see the worst in people, and
who view others as selfish, are more likely to think that government
also is a repository of greedy, self-interested forces.
Even more than opinions about the proper place of government
in people’s lives, these feelings of interpersonal mistrust are not the
types of attitudes that government policy, let alone policy surrounding
campaign finance, is likely to change. Put simply, if you are a trusting
person, you also tend to trust government.
D. Trust in Government in Comparative Perspective
By examining the shared characteristics of the groups of people
who perceive corruption, we hope to cast some doubt on the popular
(and perhaps constitutionally relevant) notion that such perceptions
relate to activity in the campaign finance system. One other method
we could use to see if something distinct in the American political system is fostering these perceptions would be to compare American
public opinion with that of other countries. If levels of public perception of corruption were comparable between the United States and
other countries with more restrictive campaign finance regimes, then
we would have an additional piece of evidence casting doubt on the
importance of the campaign finance system in shaping public opinion
about government. Unfortunately, we do not have a cross-national
poll that specifically measures perception of corruption, but the
Eurobarometer poll of fifteen European countries has asked a question concerning trust in government similar to that asked in the NES
poll: “[P]lease tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust . . .
125
When we compare the cross[your] (national[]) government?”

124

NES 2002 Post Election Survey Questions, supra note 83, at question K4 (emphasis
omitted).
125
EUROPEAN OPINION RESEARCH GROUP EEIG, EUROBAROMETER 59: PUBLIC
OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 137 (Spring 2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb59/eb59_rapport_finalen.pdf. The NES Survey con-
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national data, we find that the United States does not do too well, but
that several other countries, with very different campaign finance re126
gimes, have populations equally distrustful of their government.
Figure 11: Distrust of Government in Comparative Perspective
127
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tains a similar question. NES 2002 Post Election Survey Questions, supra note 83, at question
Q3a.
126
Eurobarometer asks respondents if they tend to trust their national government, while the U.S. question asks respondents how much of the time they can trust
the government in Washington to do what is right. Data for the United States are
available from the NES DATASET, supra note 87. The European data are available from
the EUROBAROMETER reports, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_
opinion/standard_en.htm (last accessed Oct. 13, 2004).
127
Charting results from the EUROBAROMETER reports, supra note 126, and the
NES DATASET, supra note 87.
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Figure 12: Distrust of Government in Comparative Perspective
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As Figures 11 and 12 illustrate, comfortable majorities in several
countries say they tend not to trust their government. In at least one
of the polls over the last eight years, a majority in thirteen of the sixteen countries said they tend not to trust the government, and in nine
countries, a majority, on average, tends not to trust the government.
Seventy-one percent of Italians in 1996 and Belgians in 1999 distrusted
their respective governments—the highest percentages in any country
throughout the last seven years. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany approached those results in 1996, when 68%,
63%, and 61%, respectively, distrusted their government. On average
over this time period, 58% of Americans distrusted their government,
placing the United States just behind Italy (59%) and alongside Belgium and the United Kingdom (57%). As of 2003, however, the
United States ranked thirteenth out of sixteen countries in the share
of its population that distrusted the government: only Finland, Denmark, and Luxembourg had populations that trusted their govern-

128

Charting results from the EUROBAROMETER reports, supra note 126, and the
NES DATASET, supra note 87.
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ment more. In short, Americans are quite distrustful of their government, but we are not alone.
We do not mean to overstate the significance of this comparative
analysis. Idiosyncratic factors, such as the Belgian pedophilia scandal
in 1999, or cultural differences that might make respondents less
likely to say they distrust their government, may explain much of the
differences between countries. Moreover, as suggested earlier when
we omitted the “trust-in-government” question from our analysis of
the NES data, we do not believe this question is the most relevant
when it comes to evaluating perceptions of corruption or undue influence, per se. And, in any event, we agree that the relatively high
average level of Americans’ distrust should be a cause for concern.
With all of those caveats, the fact still remains that countries with
very different political systems, most of which have public funding of
elections, nevertheless have large sections of their populations that
distrust their government. And while we can always aspire to achieve
the status of Luxembourg or Finland, purging the American mind of
its unique fear of big government (let alone making American society
similarly tiny and homogeneous) may be more than any government
program could achieve.
CONCLUSION
We began this Article with an assessment and an explanation of
the Supreme Court’s unique emphasis on the appearance of corruption in campaign finance cases. This exception to general First
Amendment rules, we think, arises less from a genuine fear of the implications of such bad appearances for democratic values than from
an admission that proving actual corruption is very difficult. With that
said, we have real concerns about the misuse of public opinion polls to
prove public perception of corruption.
There can be no doubt that the American people perceive the
campaign finance system to be corrupt and, in large numbers, will
support almost any restriction on expenditures and contributions.
While believing that campaign contributions corrupt parties and candidates and that campaign finance reform is desirable, a majority of
Americans also agree that special interests will continue to have undue
influence even once such reforms are passed. Moreover, available
survey data suggest that Americans’ perceptions of corruption are related to their views about their position in society, the incumbents in
office, or their attitudes about how government ought to tax and
spend.
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We find some support for several alternative hypotheses to the
theory that improper influences on government generate Americans’
perceptions of corruption. First, we found some support for the hypothesis that certain “out-groups,” such as African Americans, the
poor, and the less educated, are more likely to believe government is
corrupt. Second, we found some support for the hypothesis that those
who disapprove of the job the President is doing, who believe the
economy has gotten worse, or who belong to a political party different
from the President are more likely to believe that government is corrupt. We also found some support for a “libertarian-populist” hypothesis: people who simply dislike government are more likely to believe it is corrupt, as evidenced by the relationship between perceptions of
corruption and opinions of government waste and tax rate fairness.
Finally, perception of government corruption may be a subspecies of a
broader psychological phenomenon: distrust of others. Cynics who
are predisposed to see the worst in people also tend to see the worst in
government.
In the end, we must admit that large shares of the American population distrust their government and believe the campaign finance system is a source of undue influence. However, as surveys from other
countries indicate, Americans are not alone in their distrust of government, and countries with radically different campaign finance regimes also have populations registering a high level of government
distrust. For those who would look to campaign finance reform to re129
store “confidence in the system of representative [g]overnment,”
they may be disappointed by the intractability and psychological roots
of that lack of confidence.

129

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting United States
Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
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APPENDIX
The tables on the following pages present logistic regressions for
the variables described and coded below. The editors of the Law Review have requested that we provide some basic explanation for reading the regressions. The tables attempt to display the relationship between certain questions in the NES survey and the likelihood that the
respondent answers that “quite a few people running the government
are crooked” (for Appendices A and C) or that “government is pretty
much run by a few big interests.” (for Appendices B and D). Cell entries greater than 1 suggest that the variable in that column increases
the odds that individuals exhibiting that characteristic will answer that
“quite a few people running the government are crooked” or that
“government is pretty much run by a few big interests.” Cell entries
2
less than 1 suggest a negative odds ratio. The size of the R indicates
how well the model as a whole predicts the respondent’s answer to the
crooked or few interests question. As mentioned in the text, we recognize that the proposed models do not allow us to provide a comprehensive explanation that can predict definitively which respondents will perceive corruption according to these two measures. Their
chief value, however, is in identifying statistically significant factors
that add credence to the alternative hypotheses suggested in the text.
Description of Variables:
“Crooked”
Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked,
not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked?
0=not many, hardly any; 1= quite a few are crooked
“Few Big Interests”
Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking
out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?
0= benefit of all; 1= few big interests
“Race”
In addition to being American, what do you consider your main ethnic group
or nationality group?
1= White; 2= Black
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“Income”
I am going to read you a list of income categories. Please tell me which category
best describes the total income of all members of your family living in your house
in 1999 before taxes. This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions,
dividends, interest, and all other income.
Income was coded into percentiles:
1= 0-16%; 2= 17-33%; 3= 34-67%; 4= 68-95%; 5= 96-100%
“Education”
What is highest grade of school or year of college you have completed?
1= grade school or less; 2= high school; 3= some college; 4=
college or advanced degree
“Age”
What is respondent’s age (calculated from year of birth)?
Coded 17-99
“Presidential Disapproval”
Presidential Disapproval prior to 1980: Do you approve or disapprove of
the way that [the President] is handling his job as President?
1 = Approve; 2= Disapprove
Presidential Disapproval after 1980: Do you approve or disapprove of the
way [name of President] is handling his job as President? Do you [approve/disapprove] strongly or not strongly?
1= Approve, strongly; 2= Approve, not strongly; 3= Disapprove, not
strongly; 4= Disapprove, strongly
“Member of President’s Party”
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a republican, a democrat, an independent, or what? [We have recoded the variable to reflect
whether the respondent is a member of the same party as the sitting
President.]
0= No; 1= Yes
“Government Wastes Tax Money”
Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in
taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much of it?
0= Some/not very much; 1= A lot
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“Economy Last Year”
Would you say that over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better,
stayed the same or gotten worse?
0= Better; 1= Got Worse/Stayed the same
“Can’t Be Too Careful”
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?
1= Can’t be too careful; 2= Most people can be trusted
“People take Advantage”
Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a
chance, or would they try to be fair?
1= Would take advantage; 2= Would try to be fair
“Big Business Therm”, “Poor Therm” and “Welfare Therm”
I’d like to get your feelings toward some people in the news these days. I’ll read
the name of a person and I’ll ask you to rate that person on a thermometer that
runs from 0 to 100 degrees. Rating above 50 means that you feel favorable
and warm toward the person. Rating below 50 means that you feel unfavorable and cool toward the person. Rating right at the 50 degree mark means you
don’t feel particularly warm or cold. You may use any number from 0 to 100 to
tell me how favorable or unfavorable your feelings are. If we come to a person
whose name you don’t recognize, just tell me and we’ll move on to the next
one. . . Still using the thermometer, how would you rate: [Big Business, Poor
People, People on Welfare]
0-100
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Appendix A: Coefficients for Logistic Regression Model of the Log Odds
of Believing Quite a Few in Government Are Crooked
Race

1.5333

1.4603

1.3193

3

3

3

1.091

Income

0.893

0.911

0.918

0.979

Education

0.8583

0.8083

0.8083

0.7983

Age

0.9933

0.9933

0.9903

0.9813

(not included)

1.5133

1.2363

1.3452

Member of
President’s Party

0.7813

0.947

0.965

1.112

Gov’t Wastes
Tax Money

4.5753

4.1763

4.3373

4.6493

1.0873

1.045

Presidential
Disapproval

Economy Last Year

(not included) (not included)

People Would Take
Advantage of You

(not included) (not included) (not included)

0.5123

Constant

0.4263

0.3153

0.4043

2.0131

R2

0.108

0.111

0.119

0.161

N

22971

16955

11644

3241

1

p <0.05

2

p <0.01

3

p <0.001

Appendix B: Coefficients for Logistic Regression Model of the Log Odds
of Believing Government Is Run by a Few Big Interests
Race
Income

1.2173

1.060

1.061

0.852

3

3

2

0.983

0.890

0.927

0.947

Education

3

1.074

0.993

1.004

0.981

Age

1.0053

1.0043

1.0053

1.003

(not included)

2.2933

1.8153

1.161

Member of
President’s Party

0.6003

0.8413

0.8543

0.871

Gov’t Wastes
Tax Money

4.4873

4.0823

3.8933

3.6523

1.1303

1.055

Presidential
Disapproval

Economy Last Year

(not included) (not included)

People Would Take
Advantage of You

(not included) (not included) (not included)

0.4823

Constant

0.6763

0.3443

0.2893

3.3353

R2

0.119

0.123

0.122

0.116

N

23147

17387

12299

3145

1

p <0.05

2

p <0.01

3

p <0.001

1.630

1.490

0.714

1.104

0.900

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

1

1.150

1992

2

1

1.360

1990

3

1

1

1.678

1988

0.947

1.372

1984

1

0.870

0.941

1.0\41

0.883

0.944

0.886

0.870

0.873

1.032
2

3

3

1.079

0.809

0.878

0.885

0.921

0.893

0.811

0.742

0.810

0.646

3

0.851

1.402

3

1980

0.830

1.459

2

2

1978

0.792

0.794

0.879

2.290

1.077

975

1.053

1

0.844

0.862

0.935

1976

2

0.949

1974

3

2.036

1972

0.830

2

2.226

3

1970

1.082

0.658

1968

1

0.871

Income

0.469

2

Race

1964

Year

Education

3

3

0.988

3

3

1

3

0.703

1.247

1.189

0.918

1.029

0.965

1.075

0.891

0.841

0.760

0.898

1.091

1.073

3.906

4.412

6.716

3.623

4.527

4.356

3.695

3.347

4.198

3.876

4.403

3.851

3.324

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3.250

3

3

4.048

5.376

3

5.892

Gov’t
Wastes
Tax
Money

2

3

---

---

3

0.988

---

0.939

1.023

1.086

1.029

1.075

3

1.188

3

1.146

3

1.102

1.077

1.010

3

---

3

3

3

1

0.978

3

0.995

---

0.986

0.993

0.990

---

1

0.994

0.998

0.989

0.984

3

0.986

---

0.997

1

0.993

Big
Business
Therm

---

---

---

---

Econ
Last
Year

1

1.009

1.011

1.002

1

1.009

2

1.011

1

1.008

1

1.007

1.007

1

2

1

1.006

0.992

---

3

0.987

3

0.988

3

0.989

1

2

0.993

0.989

0.991

+++

+++
1.008

---

0.994

---

---

---

---

---

Welfare
Therm

---

1

1.010

1.006

0.999

---

---

---

Poor
Therm

1

p <0.05 p <0.01 p <0.001
- - - indicates question was not asked in that particular year
+++ indicates sample size is too small for analysis

0.992

1.077

1.042

1.228

3

1.138

0.988

1.326

1.100

1.003

2

3

2

1.209

1.734

1.510

1.800

1

+++
0.706

1

0.682

---

0.871

---

1

0.749

Member
Pres’s
Party

---

3

0.975

0.980

0.985

0.988

0.996

0.996

1.002

0.994

2

0.989

0.997

1.004

1.000

1.005

1

0.991

0.995

0.992

Age

Presidential
Disapproval

3

2

---

3

0.627

0.803

0.759

0.606

---

0.488

0.495

3

3

1

0.652

0.651

---

0.880

---

--0.676

0.192

---

---

2.977

1

4.430

1.701

2

5.579

3

0.338

3

0.477

1

0.284

---

1.017

3

0.194

0.585

2.231

---

---

3

0.509

3

0.534

1.443

2

0.284

2.736

3

8.091

Constant

---

3

3

3

0.515

---

2

3

0.603

0.446

People
Take
Advantage

---

---

0.541

3

0.569

0.637

---

3

0.410

0.818

Can’t
be Too
Careful

Appendix C: Coefficients for Logistic Regression Models of the Log Odds of
Believing Quite a Few in Government are Crooked by Year
2

0.155

0.183

0.189

0.180

0.138

0.141

0.137

0.135

0.101

0.114

0.098

0.192

0.182

0.159

0.099

0.158

0.188

R

505

958

934

1125

1251

1619

1353

1222

1333

988

1577

1214

998

1677

1357

1150

1226

N

0.511

1.4179

1.187

1.148

1.114

0.700

0.713

0.848

1.101

1.239

0.964

1.079

1.059

0.904

1.079

0.836

1.820

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

1

0.465

2

0.825

1964

1966

Race

Year

2

2

2

0.902

0.911

1.102

1.002

0.906

1.028

1.066

0.833

1.106

0.931

0.966

0.827

1.057

0.904

0.907

0.821

1.025

0.962

0.842

1

Income

1.174

1.044

1.026

0.984

0.935

1.082

1.155

0.855

1.017

1.101

0.782

1

1.113

0.965

1.029

0.937

0.983

0.818

1

1.012

1.072

Education

2

3

2

1

2

0.999

1.007

1.005

1

0.625

0.774

0.943

0.722

0.855

0.836

0.820

0.797

0.731

1

0.816

0.896

0.881

0.700

1

1.080

3

4.615

3.419

3.216

3.696

4.710

4.254

4.605

3.644

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3.248

3.693

3.361

5.578

3

3

2.780

4.097

3.999

3

3

4.598

3.791

---

3

4.706

Gov’t
Wastes
Tax
Money

1.123

0.952

1.084

1

1.134

1.102

1

1.162

1.244

3

1.033

1.092

1.083

1.139

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Econ
Last
Year

3

2

3

3

3

0.982

0.978

---

2

3

3

0.972

0.978

3

0.989

---

0.986

0.985

---

0.981

---

0.973

3

3

0.974

0.979

---

0.981

3

3

0.988

3

0.986

Big
Business
Therm

1.005

1.004

1.000

2

1.017

1.007

0.997

1.010

1

1.000

1.007

1

2

0.991

0.996

---

0.999

0.991

1

0.997

0.990

2

0.996

0.993

---

+++

+++
---

---

0.988

---

---

---

---

---

---

Welfare
Therm

---

1.005

0.998

1.001

---

---

---

---

Poor
Therm

1

p <0.05 2 p <0.01 3 p <0.001
- - - indicates question was not asked in that particular year
+++ indicates sample size is too small for analysis

1.599

3

0.991

1.135

1.217

1.156

1.257

1.557

3

1.002

0.990

1.020

1.020

3

3

3

3

1.355

1.481

1.570

1.425

3

3

3

1.002

1.005

1.000

1.009

2.089

2.611

3

0.790

+++
2.331

0.568

3

0.614

3

3

3

0.510

0.535

Member
Pres’s
Party

---

---

---

---

1

1.001

1.013

1.013

1.005

1.012

1

2

1.010

1.013

1.009

Age

Presidential
Disapproval

2

1

3

0.998

0.521

0.877

0.706

---

---

-- - -

---

---

---

---

---

0.602

2

3

0.402

0.690

---

0.519

3

3

0.368

1

0.660

Can’t
be Too
Careful

1

3

3

0.835

0.765

0.519

3

0.465

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

0.588

2

1

0.647

0.503

---

0.677

---

3

0.384

People
Take
Advantage

Appendix D: Coefficients for Logistic Regression Models of the Log Odds of
Believing the Government is Run by a Few Big Interests By Year

0.170

17.786

1.306
3

2

8.102

6.244

2

0.419

0.043

3

2.401

0.275

1

1

0.279

1.788

0.611

5.358

1

1

7.082

9.947

3

0.439

13.368

3

3

10.381

2

6.518

Constant
2

0.239

0.152

0.109

0.170

0.134

0.124

0.173

0.160

0.171

0.133

0.126

0.130

0.183

0.217

0.188

0.146

0.185

0.103

0.210

R

492

935

904

1009

1217

1594

1325

1203

1298

993

944

1532

1153

957

1598

1277

1092

1026

1174

N

